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Miguel Garcı´a-Posada • Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti
Abstract Previous literature finds that the quality of
judicial enforcement has a positive impact on average
firm size, but it has not disentangled its effect on the
growth of incumbent firms from that on business
demography. This distinction is crucial, as entrants are
generally smaller than incumbents, but both high entry
rates and high firm growth are associated with better
economic performance. This paper fills this gap,
finding that judicial efficacy fosters the growth of
incumbents and promotes entry in Spain. The paper
also shows for the first time that the specific type of
judicial procedure that companies face in case of a
conflict, rather than the overall functioning of courts,
is the relevant matter. Specifically, judicial efficacy at
the declaratory stage (when a debt is verified by a
judge) has a positive impact on both firm growth and
entry, while it has no impact at the execution stage
(when the judge requires its payment).
Keywords Enforcement institutions ! Judicial
efficacy ! Firm size ! Firm growth ! Business
demography
JEL Classifications D23 ! K41 ! K12 ! L11 !
L25 ! L26 ! O12 ! R12
1 Introduction
Spanish firms are small in international terms and they
operate in markets with low entry and exit rates. Nu´n˜ez
(2004) found that the average size of firms in Spainwas
below that of firms in several other European countries
and in the USA. Lo´pez-Garcı´a and Sa´nchez (2010)
showed that Spanish companies were on average half
as large as the companies in other European econo-
mies. Nu´n˜ez (2004) showed that the turnover rate (sum
of entry and exit rates) in Spain was 16 % lower than
that in other countries analyzed except Germany.
Analyzing more recent data, Lo´pez-Garcı´a and Puente
(2007) reached the same conclusion in the context of
OECD countries. Garcı´a-Posada and Mora-Sangui-
netti (2014) also find that both entry and exit rates in
Spain are lower than the European average.
The analysis of those facts is relevant as numerous
studies have shown that there are positive links among
firm size, business demography, innovation and pro-
ductivity growth (see, inter alia, Brandt 2004; Pilat
2004; Scarpetta et al. 2002; Foster et al. 1998; Lo´pez-
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Garcı´a and Montero 2012; Martin-Marcos and Jau-
mandreu 2004; Huergo and Jaumandreu 2004; Farin˜as
and Ruano 2004). Along with this, Spain has been
characterized by low productivity growth and low
innovation over the most recent years (Dolado et al.
2013; Bentolila et al. 2011; Mora-Sanguinetti and
Fuentes 2012a, b).
The literature has suggested several determinants of
firm size and growth, such as market size, economic
development, access to credit, the stock of physical
and human capital and the relevant industry. Business
demography may also be affected by labor market
regulations, entry regulations and personal bankruptcy
laws. In addition to the above factors, an effective
judicial system (or, more generally, the quality of the
economy’s ‘‘enforcement institutions’’) seems to have
an effect on average firm size. Following Kumar et al.
(2001), countries with efficient judicial systems seem
to have larger firms. Laeven and Woodruff (2007) and
Dougherty (2014) found that firms located in Mexican
states with weak legal environments are smaller than
those located in states with stronger ones. Giacomelli
and Menon (2013) examined evidence for Italy and
showed that the average size of manufacturing firms is
lower in municipalities where the period of time
required to obtain a judgment is longer. Fabbri (2010)
found that law enforcement in Spain has a significant
impact on business financing and on firm size based on
her sample of manufacturing companies.
But all these studies focus on the impact of judicial
enforcement on average firm size without differenti-
ating between the two possible channels: the effect on
the growth of incumbent firms (intensive margin) and
the effect on entry and exit rates (extensive margin).1
However, identifying the specific channel is crucial in
order to draw the correct policy implications, as
entrants are generally much smaller than incumbents,
but both high entry rates and high firm growth are
associated with higher productivity growth and inno-
vation. To put it differently, higher average firm size is
not always desirable, as it could reflect sclerotic
markets characterized by low entry and exit rates
rather than by high-growth firms. In this paper, we find
that judicial efficacy fosters the growth of incumbents
and that it also promotes entry, while it has no impact
on firms’ exits. Hence, increasing judicial efficacy
would be welfare-improving in Spain, regardless on its
impact on average firm size.
The paper also shows, for the first time, that the
specific type of judicial procedure that companies
must face in case of a conflict is the relevant matter and
not so much the overall functioning of the judicial
system. Consequently, in this paper, we differentiate
between the specific impact of the various civil
procedures available both at the declaratory stage
and at the execution stage. The study of different
procedures allows us to determine what stage is more
important for business decisions: whether the time at
which the existence of a debt is declared and
acknowledged by a judge (declaratory stage) or the
time at which the judge enforces its payment (exec-
utory stage). Specifically, we find that judicial efficacy
at the declaratory stage has a positive impact on firm
size, firm growth and entry rates, while judicial
efficacy at the execution stage has no impact whatso-
ever. Various reasons may be influencing this fact:
penalties for delayed payment, risk aversion (even if
the probability of punishment is small, individuals
may suffer from a disutility higher than the expected
punishment), internalization of social values (the
‘‘right’’ thing to do is to abide by the law, once there
is a ruling against the company) and reputation (there
is an immediate damage to the reputation of the
company when it loses a trial, whether or not it decides
to comply with the obligations imposed in the
judgment). In any case, our findings warn that the
use of ‘‘aggregate’’ measures of civil efficacy, as done
in the previous literature, may be incomplete.
Finally, this is first time that the relationship among
firm size, firm growth, business demography and
judicial efficacy in Spain is analyzed following the
entry into force of the new civil procedural rules of
2000, which completely changed the civil justice
system in Spain.2 We also use data at the provincial
level, whereas previous studies on Spain (Fabbri 2010)
used data at the aggregate regional level (Comunid-
ades Auto´nomas) and linked them with data on
manufacturing firms, while our data cover all relevant
industries.
1 To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers,
Chemin (2009) and Lichand and Soares (2014), which study the
impact of judicial efficacy on entry, but restricted to the
probability of becoming self-employed.
2 The data used by Fabbri (2010) represent judicial perfor-
mance from the old civil judicial system of Spain, which was
abrogated in 2000.
The importance of studying the effectiveness of the
judiciary and its impact on firm size and business
demography in Spain is justified by the fact that the
Spanish judicial system demonstrates low efficiency
compared with that of other countries. Spain holds the
position 26 out of a total of 35 legal systems in its
ability to resolve disputes before the first instance
courts according to the database constructed recently
by the OECD (Palumbo et al. 2013). Even less
favorable results can be found on the Doing Business
(DB) Project of the World Bank in its ‘‘enforcing
contracts’’ indicator, published since 2004. Spain
ranked 64th among 185 countries covered in the
reports of 2012 and 2013. Specifically, Spain was in a
worse position than other economies with similar
levels of development such as the other big European
economies (with the exception of Italy). The conclu-
sions of this paper are thus relevant for this general
problem. Thanks to the distinction of the different
stages of judicial procedures, this research provides a
guide on where to intervene peremptorily in order to
optimize the resources invested in the Spanish judicial
system: in order to promote entry and firm growth,
preference should be given to speeding up declaratory
judgments (at the expense of other potential areas).3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents a discussion of the theoretical
channels linking judicial efficacy with firm size.
Section 3 explains the construction of various mea-
sures of judicial efficacy and firm size, as well as the
control variables and some sample characteristics.
Section 4 presents our estimation strategy, and Sec-
tion 5 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 provides some conclusions.
2 Theoretical background: how the functioning
of the judicial system affects firm size, firm
growth and business demography
The literature suggests several channels according to
which we should observe an impact of the judicial
system on firm size, firm growth and business
demography.
First, judicial efficacy affects firm growth through
the investment decisions faced by firms and entrepre-
neurs. As poor contract enforcement increases pro-
jects’ risks and raises their expected costs, this can
lead to less investment and reduce growth opportuni-
ties. This is corroborated by the empirical evidence of
Laeven and Woodruff (2007), who find a positive
relationship between judicial efficacy and average
firm size. This relationship is stronger for proprietor-
ships than for corporations, as the owners of the latter
are more protected against contract enforcement risks
thanks to limited liability. Laeven and Woodruff
(2007) also argue that an improvement in the
functioning of the judicial system will increase
average firm size by making the least productive firms
exit the market and the most productive ones grow. An
improved judicial system implies higher production
efficiency, which will increase the demand for
production factors (capital and labor) and will in turn
raise wages and rental rates. This will induce low-
ability entrepreneurs to leave self-employment for
salaried work, while only the most talented entrepre-
neurs will continue to run their own businesses.
Therefore, there will be fewer companies and those
companies will employ more workers. As a result,
average firm size will increase.
Second, since poor contract enforcement increases
transaction costs, firms’ optimal response may be
vertical integration, implying a negative relationship
between judicial efficacy and firm size.
Third, in the absence of well-functioning courts,
parties need to rely on relational contracting, which
may lead to high switching costs and barriers to entry:
trust in existing suppliers may make firms reluctant to
purchase from new suppliers (Johnson et al. 2002).
Hence, better contract enforcement may increase entry
rates. The development of the judicial system also
allows trade of more complex goods, as a third party
can verify the terms and conditions of the contract,
encouraging firms to undertake specific investments
and probably grow more.
Fourth, Chemin (2009) finds several reasons why
an improvement in court efficacy dramatically
increased entry rates in his study of Pakistan’s judicial
reform. The reform improved entrepreneurs’ confi-
dence that their workforce would not be prevented
from working due to law and order situations. As
unemployed individuals were more confident in their
ability to obtain credit, they applied for loans and they
3 As the Spanish government is drafting a bill (new Ley
Orga´nica del Poder Judicial, LOPJ) in order to reorganize some
general aspects of the judicial system, this paper results may
contribute to the current debate on the topic.
also applied or sought land, buildings or machinery to
establish their businesses.
Finally, both firm growth and business demography
can be indirectly influenced by the quality of the
judicial system through the credit channel. Inefficient
systems are associated with difficulties in contract
enforcement and hence with weaker creditor protec-
tion. As a result, weaker investor protection would
decrease the availability of credit, hampering firm
growth. This conjecture is corroborated by Jappelli
et al. (2005), who find that credit is more widely
available in the Italian provinces where there is higher
judicial efficiency. Fabbri (2010) finds that the cost of
financing is higher in regions where court proceedings
take longer and this could have an effect on firm size as
well. Judicial system improvements seem also to be
related to higher access to finance and lower costs of
credit in India (Visaria 2009; Chemin 2012). Regard-
ing business demography, greater judicial ineffective-
ness, by reducing access to external finance, also
reduces entry of new enterprises, which are usually
smaller than incumbent firms (Giacomelli and Menon
2013). As a result, the overall impact of reduced
funding on average firm size may be ambiguous when
measured empirically (Kumar et al. 2001).
In summary, the above channels4 imply an ambig-
uous impact of judicial efficacy on firm size and
growth (‘‘intensive margin’’) and a positive one on
entry and exit rates (‘‘extensive margin’’). Hence, the
sign of the former and the magnitude of the latter are
empirical matters.
3 Data
3.1 Measuring the efficacy of specific judicial
procedures in Spain
This paper constructs a set of efficacy measures by
judicial procedure using direct information provided
by the courts, specifically by the Spanish General
Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder
Judicial, hereinafter CGPJ). The CGPJ has published a
database reporting the number of cases filed, resolved
and still pending in the Spanish judicial system by
region, court, year, subject and procedure. Therefore,
this information allows us to differentiate by the
specific type of civil procedure used at the declaratory
stage [ordinary judgment, verbal judgment, payment
(monitory) procedure and bills of exchange and
cheques procedure] or at the execution stage. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
differentiates among different civil procedures in
contrast with previous literature, which used data on
‘‘aggregate’’ civil proceedings.
The data also provide information on the nature of
the conflict (civil, criminal, administrative and labor)
and on the specific court in which the procedure takes
place. Constructing efficacy measures from the raw
CGPJ data is a complex issue, so the following
paragraphs attempt to explain it.
As an outline (see Fig. 1),5 first we should identify
the jurisdiction that deals with the conflicts we
consider most relevant to the functioning of a com-
pany. Different types of conflicts are dealt with by
different jurisdictions inside the Spanish judicial
system (civil, social, administrative and criminal),
which are served by different groups of judges and
courts. Spanish companies may be confronted with
very different types of conflicts in their daily func-
tioning. A company may have to deal with conflicts
with its employees (for instance, a dismissed worker
may sue the company). In this case, conflicts are
regulated by labor legislation and will be resolved in
accordance with such laws by the employment tribu-
nals (juzgados de lo social). A companymay also have
to deal with conflicts with public administrations. For
example, a company may be discriminated against in a
public procedure or the administration may fail to
respond correctly to a request from a company. Those
conflicts will be subject to administrative law and may
have to be resolved through appeals to administrative
courts (juzgados de lo contencioso-administrativo).
Finally, conflicts may arise with other private firms or
other private parties such as suppliers and customers.
Examples of such conflicts include a non-payment of a
service, disputes concerning the interpretation of a
4 We do not explain an additional channel, the enforcement of
employment protection legislations, as our database allows us to
differentiate between different types of conflicts, and thus, we
have focused the empirical analysis solely on civil cases. See
Giacomelli and Menon (2013) for a discussion on the topic.
5 The basic organization of the Spanish judicial system is
regulated by the above mentioned LOPJ. Following the National
reform programme (2014), the government will present a draft
bill to reform that Law.
contract for the sale of goods and claims related to the
intellectual property of a work or service. Those
conflicts will be dealt with by civil courts (juzgados de
lo civil). We decided to focus our analysis on civil
conflicts because we consider that they are the most
relevant to the activity of companies.6
Once we have identified the relevant jurisdiction
(the civil jurisdiction), we need to find the specific
courts where the conflict is going to be resolved. These
are the first instance courts (juzgados de primera
instancia) and the first instance and instruction courts
(juzgados de primera instancia e instruccio´n). Con-
flicts must enter the judicial system through these
courts.7 Finally, the specific procedure that must be
used is determined by the Civil Procedural Law8
(CPL), which regulates all civil conflicts in Spain.9
First, the claimant company will have to obtain a
declaratory judgment acknowledging that a debt or
other right exists. If that is the case, the judge will
declare the obligation of the debtor to pay or to
compensate the right infringed. There are different
types of declaratory judgments (see Fig. 1). Ordinary
judgments (juicios ordinarios) are used if the conflict
involves a sum of at least 6,000 Euros or relates to
certain matters (such as appeals against decisions of
the governing bodies of the company). Verbal judg-
ments (juicios verbales) are given where the disputed
amount is less than 6,000 Euros. Simpler exchange
(juicios cambiarios) and monitory (juicios monitorios)
procedures may be converted into verbal or ordinary
judgments if the debtor defends the claim. Thus, we
consider ordinary judgments to be the most interesting
declaratory judgment to analyze. After the declaratory
stage, an execution judgment may take place. This
only occurs when the debtor does not pay the debt or
fails to comply with the obligations imposed by the
judge at the declaratory stage. That is, the claimant
will ask the judge to (forcibly) ‘‘execute’’ the decision.
The judge may, for instance, seize the amounts of a
debt from the accounts of the debtor.
Using the raw data available from the CGPJ
database, we have constructed a measure of efficacy
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Fig. 1 Outline of the
Spanish judicial system
6 A company may have also violated the public interest and
therefore be criminally liable. However, such cases are quite
rare under Spanish law.
7 In this study, we do not work with the second instance (i.e.,
appeals against the courts of first instance). The reason is that
only 7.45 % of first instance cases are appealed to the second
instance. Moreover, the problems of inefficacy of the Spanish
judicial system (compared to other countries) seem to be
concentrated in the first instance and not in the second,
according to the results of the OECD (Palumbo et al. 2013).This
does not rule out a possible future extension providing some
analysis of the second instance.
8 Law 1/2000, of January 7th (Civil Procedural Law).
9 Two clarifications must be added. First, there are changes in
this reasoning if the company has a conflict with a private
subject which is foreign, but even in this case, the CPL may be
used (depending on the case). Second, it must be noted that some
Footnote 9 continued
extrajudicial solutions may be found by the parties, such as
sending the case to arbitration. However, even in that case, only
a judge can enforce an arbitral decision, always using the CPL
and the judicial system.
for each court (which we have aggregated at the
provincial level) and for each procedure (see Padilla
et al. 2007; Mora-Sanguinetti 2010, 2012a, b): the
congestion rate (see equation below).
Congestion ratei;t ¼ Pending casesi;t#1 þ New casesi;t
Cases resolvedi;t
The congestion rate is defined as the ratio between the
sum of pending cases (measured at the beginning of
the period) plus new cases in a specific year and the
cases resolved in the same year. A lower congestion
rate is related to greater efficacy of the procedures
inside the judicial system. An average congestion rate
of 2.41 in Madrid over the period 2001–2009 indicates
that around two and a half cases (summing up the
pending cases and the new cases arriving to the courts
of Madrid in a specific year) were awaiting resolution
while the courts were able to resolve just one.
The system of procedures explained above was
adopted in 2000, replacing the previous system (CPL
of 1881), and no business conflict has been initiated
using the 1881 CLP since January 1, 2001 (Mora-
Sanguinetti 2010). Therefore, although the CGPJ
performance data of the civil courts are available
since 1995, we only use data from 2001 onward. For
the purposes of the analysis herein, we have chosen to
aggregate the data at the provincial level,10 although
more disaggregated data on the judicial system are
available. While a province may comprise one or more
judicial districts, all of them share the same first
instance (and first instance and instruction) courts,
implying that the province is the relevant territorial
unit for our analyses.
The CPL establishes the rules of territorial compe-
tence, that is, the court that will resolve the conflict. As
a general rule, claims are entered at the province of the
registered office of the defendant.11 If the dispute
concerns the annual accounts of the company, the
court must be that of the province where the company
has its registered office and the same rule generally
applies to bankruptcy proceedings. If the claim relates
to real assets (i.e., buildings), the conflict will be
resolved at the province where the real assets are
located. Moreover, in the case of small firms (the vast
majority of the Spanish businesses), most of their trade
and relations with other companies are likely to occur
within one province.12
Although the CPL is a national Law, the efficacy of
courts may differ among Spanish provinces due to
supply and demand factors. On the supply side, the
resources invested in the justice administration differ,
at least at the regional level.13 On the demand side,
litigation propensity may differ among provinces. This
geographical variation in efficacy is illustrated in
Fig. 2, which shows the average congestion rate for
ordinary judgments (map on top) and executions (map
on the bottom) at the provincial level for the period
2001–2009. There was, on average, a difference of
1.16 congestion points between the most effective
(A´lava) and the least effective (Alicante) province
throughout the period. The difference is 3.87 points in
the case of executions, between A´lava (the most
effective on average) and Castello´n. Figure 3 shows
the variation through time of the congestion rate
(again, for ordinary judgments and for executions) for
a group of provinces with low congestion (A´lava,
Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Zaragoza), with high con-
gestion (Baleares, Ma´laga, Almerı´a) and for Madrid,
Spain’s capital and its largest city. As expected,
congestion rates increased during the first years of the
current economic crisis (2008 and 2009) in most
provinces, as conflicts between contract parties are
likely to arise when there are financial difficulties.
3.2 Measuring firm size and firm growth
We use two different gauges of firm size, total revenue
and total employment to check the sensitivity of our
10 Excluding Ceuta and Melilla (no information is available for
those provinces).
11 Articles 50 and 51 of the CPL.
12 The competence at a more disaggregated level (i.e., the
allocation of civil affairs within the same province) should not
be a concern for the analysis. The allocation of cases among the
courts of first instance of a particular province is made by the
dean’s office on the basis of predetermined rules, which include,
among others, random mechanisms (with several corrections).
That is, firms cannot choose to litigate before a particular judge
they may prefer.
13 The Spanish regions (Comunidades Auto´nomas) have some
powers related to the administration of justice in Spain. Even
though the judicial power is not properly transferred to the
regions, management of judicial resources is influenced by the
policies developed by the regions. For instance, they decide how
much money is invested in new courts each year in their
territories, even though the new courts are integrated into a
system that is centrally governed.
results.14 Those variables are obtained at the firm level
from the SABI database for the period 2001–2009.
SABI is a database that contains the annual accounts of
Spanish companies,15 both private and publicly held,
and general information, such as the location of the
registered office, the year of incorporation and the
A
B
Fig. 2 Congestion rate:
geographical variation.
a Ordinary judgements.
b Executions. Source: Self-
elaboration and Consejo
General del Poder Judicial
(2012)
14 The Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient between the two
variables is 0.77.
15 The source of these data is generally the office of the
Registrar of Companies.
main industry of activity. The data on nominal revenue
from SABI are deflated using sector-specific16 value-
added deflators from the OECD’s STAN database.
We do not use an additional measure of firm size
and total assets, because assets in SABI are valued at
their acquisition (historical) cost and SABI does not
provide their purchase date, so they cannot be deflated.
Using them at their book value would underestimate
the size of old firms and overestimate the size of young
firms. Moreover, total assets are comprised of very
different items such as land, buildings, machinery,
inventories or cash, so we would need a specific
deflator for each component. But the fact that real
revenue and total assets are highly correlated (0.73)
suggests that we are not losing very relevant
information.
Regarding the data selection criteria, we eliminate
firms that entered or exited the market17 during the
period of study, i.e., 2001–2009. There are two reasons
to do so. First, we isolate the ‘‘intensive margin,’’ i.e.,
the impact of judicial efficacy on the size of incumbent
firms. Second, we substantially reduce a major cause
of non-random attrition in our panel: since the firms
that enter or exit the market are, on average, smaller
than the incumbents in Spain (Lo´pez-Garcı´a and
Puente 2007), the probability that some observation is
missing may be related to firm size. State-owned
companies are also eliminated because, in Spain, they
may resolve their conflicts in different courts18 and
under different legal procedures than private firms19
and because the factors that determine their size may
not be market-driven. We exclude foreign companies,
as they may resolve their conflicts in other legal
systems by engaging in ‘‘forum shopping.’’ We also
eliminate consolidated accounts, i.e., the financial
statements that integrate the accounts of the parent
company and those of its subsidiaries into a single
aggregated accounting figure. The reason is that
several subsidiaries may have different registered
offices and in turn use the courts of different provinces.
Nonprofit organizations and membership organiza-
tions are also excluded. Finally, we also eliminate non-
yearly financial accounts—since flow variables such
as turnover can only be compared for firms with the
same time length in their accounts—and observations
with data inconsistencies.20 Although the available
information does not allow us to eliminate multi-plant
firms and companies with multiple plants located in
different provinces are likely to use the courts of those
provinces, this problem is not severe in the case of
Spain, since the majority of Spanish firms are mono-
plant.21 Nevertheless, in a robustness analysis, we
have removed the financial services industry, where
multi-plant firms are much more common. The
results—see online Appendix D—are very similar.
The final sample has around 460,000 firms.22
Online Appendix A shows their size distribution by
province and by year as the arithmetic averages of
employment and real revenue, respectively, suggest-
ing that our sample is representative of the population
of Spanish firms.
3.3 Measuring business demography
We compute entry and exit rates using census data
from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE).
The entry (exit) rate is the number of firms that enter
(exit) a province in a given year as a percentage of all
the active firms in that province at the end of the year
(which include the new and continuing firms). Notice
that those definitions of entry and exit rates implicitly
characterize the relevant market at the territorial level,
which is a simplifying assumption: while market
16 Industries are defined at the two-digit level following the
ISIC Rev.3 in STAN and the NACE Rev. 1.1. in SABI. There is
a perfect matching between the two classifications.
17 We identify as an entrant a firm whose incorporation was in
2001 or later. To identify the firms that exited the market, we use
SABI’s classification of companies into two main categories:
‘‘active’’ firms (i.e., currently operating in the market) and
‘‘inactive’’.
18 Administrative courts (tribunales de lo contencioso-admin-
istrativo) instead of civil courts.
19 Specifically, they are often subject to Administrative Law,
rather than Civil Law.
20 For instance, negative values in stock variables or observa-
tions that violate basic accounting norms.
21 According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE),
the average number of firms in the period 2001–2009 was
3,051,634 while the average number of plants in that period was
3,389,330, which implies that each firm had, on average, 1.1
plants.
22 Despite removing the firms that entered or exited the market,
we have an unbalanced panel due to the uneven coverage across
years. For instance, the last year of the period, 2009, has the
lowest number of firms because the usual time lag in the
submission of financial statements by firms is 2 years (Ribeiro
et al. 2010) and the data from SABI were extracted at the end of
2010.
definition is often a difficult task, it usually hinges on
two dimensions, the spatial one and the industrial one.
Unfortunately, we could not compute entry/exit rates
at the province-industry level due to data constraints.23
Both variables display substantial variation across
provinces and years. Figure 4 shows the average
(2001–2009) entry and exit rates by province in Spain.
Average entry rates for the period 2001–2009 range
between the 15 % of Caceres24 and the 8.2 % of Soria.
Average exit rates for the same period range between
the 11.8 % of Gerona and the 7.6 % of Soria. There is
little correlation between entry and exit rates (0.01).
Entry rates have decreased and exit rates have
Fig. 3 Congestion rate:
time variation. a Ordinary
judgments. b Executions.
Source: Self-elaboration and
Consejo General del Poder
Judicial (2012)
23 We could only construct entry rates (but no exit rates) at the
province-industry level for limited liability firms with more than
50 employees. We then ran entry rates on congestion rates, our
set of province-level controls, time dummies and province-
industry fixed effects, i.e., a dummy for every province-industry
combination. The results—see online Appendix E—are quali-
tatively the same as the ones displayed in this paper.
24 This figure seems to be partially driven by the high entry rate
of firms in Ca´ceres in 2001. We have contacted the data
provider, the Spanish National Statistics Institute, to check
whether it was a mistake in the original source. As a robustness
check, we have done all the econometric analyses substituting
that figure by the province-mean in the period 2002–2009. The
results have not qualitatively changed.
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increased since the onset of the last recession
(2007–2009), as shown in Fig. 5.
3.4 Control variables
The literature has suggested several determinants of
firm size and growth and/or business demography.
Market size, per capita income and economic growth
may have a positive impact on firm size (Laeven and
Woodruff 2007; Lucas 1978; Tybout 2000; Urata and
Kawai 2002). Access to credit is also a determinant of
firm growth (Beck et al. 2008), as is the amount of
available physical and human capital (Lucas 1978;
Rosen 1982; Kremer 1993; Tybout 2000) and the
industry in question (Kumar et al. 2001). In addition to
those factors, business demography may be affected
by labor market regulations (e.g., Botero et al. 2004),
entry regulations (e.g., Djankov et al. 2002) and
personal bankruptcy laws (e.g., Armour and Cumming
2008).
Most of our controls are province-level variables.
We measure market size by the province’s GDP.25
Economic development is captured by GDP per capita
and the unemployment rate.
To measure access to credit, we include the banking
credit to GDP ratio (credit/GDP), the number of bank
branches per 1,000 persons (branches), the non-
performing loans ratio of credit institutions (Npl ratio)
and the ratio of defaulted accounts receivable to GDP
(Dar/GDP). Banking credit to GDP ratio and branches
per capita are standard measures of financial devel-
opment (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Giacomelli and
Menon 2013).We expect higher ratios to be associated
with less financial constraints. The ratio of defaulted
accounts receivable to GDP is an alternative proxy of
credit constraints that focuses on trade credit instead of
banking credit (Padilla et al. 2007). A higher ratio
means, ceteris paribus, lower incentives for borrowers
to repay—probably because of poor creditor protec-
tion or contract enforcement—which causes more
credit rationing. The same reasoning applies to the
non-performing loans ratio.
It also seems appropriate to control for industrial
composition since the type of industry is a determinant
of firm size due to factors such as economies of scale
and economies of scope. To capture industrial com-
position, we compute the ratio of the gross value added
of the main six industries (primary sector, energy,
manufacturing, construction, market services, non-
market services26) over the total gross value added of
each province.
We control for other market characteristics. We
measure the degree of competition with the Herfin-
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Fig. 5 National averages of
entry and exit rates over the
period 2001–2009
25 Unfortunately, the province-level GDP is only available in
nominal terms, while it would be preferred to use it in real terms.
But the fact that the GDP is strongly correlated (0.98) with an
alternative real measure of market size, population, suggests that
this problem is minor in our case.
26 By non-market services, we mean public administration and
defense, compulsory social security, education, health and
social services.
Table 1 Description of variables
Variable Definition Scale/units Period Source
Employment No. of employees Persons By firm,
2001–2009
SABI
Real revenue Nominal revenue deflated by value-added
deflator
Millions € By firm,
2001–2009
SABI and OECD
Age No. of years since company’s registration Years By firm,
2001–2009
SABI
Tangibility Tangible fixed assets to total assets Fraction By firm,
2001–2009
SABI
Congestion rate (ordinary) Ratio between the sum of pending cases
(measured at the beginning of the period)
plus new cases in a specific year and the
cases resolved in the same year. The cases
may be ordinary, verbal, monitory,
exchange or executions
Fraction By province,
2001–2009
Consejo General del
Poder Judicial
Congestion rate (verbal) Fraction By province,
2001–2009
Consejo General del
Poder Judicial
Congestion rate (monitory) Fraction By province,
2001–2009
Consejo General del
Poder Judicial
Congestion rate (exchange) Fraction By province,
2001–2009
Consejo General del
Poder Judicial
Congestion rate (executions) Fraction By province,
2001–2009
Consejo General del
Poder Judicial
Entry rate No. of firms that enter a market in a given
year as a percentage of all the active firms
in the market at the end of that year
% By province,
2001–2009
Spanish National
Statistics Institute
(INE)
Exit rate No. of firms that exit a market in a given
year as a percentage of all the active firms
in the market at the end of that year
% By province,
2001–2009
Spanish National
Statistics Institute
(INE)
GDP Current GDP at market price Millions € By province,
2001–2009
INE (Regional
accounts)
GDP per capita Ratio between current GDP and population Thousands
€
By province,
2001–2009
INE (Regional
accounts)
Unemployment rate Percentage of total workforce who are
unemployed and are looking for a paid
job
% By province,
2001–2009
La Caixa
Credit/GDP Loans to Spanish companies by Spanish
financial institutions, divided by GDP
% By province,
2001–2009
Bank of Spain and INE
Npl ratio Ratio of non-performing loans to total
banking loans (only to Spanish companies
by Spanish credit
Fraction By province,
2001–2009
Bank of Spain
Dar/GDP Trade credit in arrears divided by GDP Fraction By province,
2001–2009
Spanish National
Statistics Institute
(INE)
Branches No. of bank branches per 10,000 people Per 10,000 By province,
2001–2009
La Caixa
Weight
primary/energy/
manufacturing/
construction/market
services/non-market
services
Ratio of the gross value added of the main
five industries (primary sector, energy,
manufacturing, construction, market
services, non-market services) over the
total gross value added of each province
Fraction By province,
2001–2009
INE (Regional
accounts)
Capital intensity Average ratio of capital stock (tangible
fixed assets plus inventories) to the
number of employees
Fraction By province,
2001–2009
SABI
dahl–Hirschman Index (HHI).27 We take into account
the average level of vertical integration in the prov-
ince, since firms may respond to poor contract
enforcement by vertically integrating their production
process and vertically integrated firms are expected to
be larger. Vertical integration is measured by the ratio
of value added to sales, where value added has been
corrected for extraordinary positions.28 This ratio is
expected to be higher for vertically integrated firms
because of their lower expenses in outside purchases
of intermediate inputs. We first compute this ratio at
the firm level and then we average it across firms. We
also control for differences in capital–labor ratios. We
first compute the firm-level capital intensity as the
ratio of capital stock (tangible fixed assets plus
inventories) to the number of employees and then we
average it across firms. Finally, we take into account
the proportion of corporations, since limited liability
incentivizes investment and growth.
We capture the availability of human capital with
the share of PhD graduates on population. We include
the share of foreigners on population as well, since
cultural factors may influence entrepreneurship and
foreigners may have a different propensity to litigate.
To keep into account the negative impact of crimi-
nality on economic activity and businesses, we
compute crime rates as the number of convictions
over population.29 Finally, following the findings of
Carmignani and Giacomelli (2010), we use the
number of lawyers per 10,000 people (Lawyers) as a
proxy of litigation intensity, since cheaper access to
Table 1 continued
Variable Definition Scale/units Period Source
Vertical integration Average ratio of value added to sales,
where value added has been corrected for
extraordinary positions
Fraction By province,
2001–2009
SABI
Incorporation rate Proportion of limited liability companies Fraction By province,
2001–2009
Spanish National
Statistics Institute
(INE)
Foreigners Share of foreigners in population % By province,
2001–2010
Fundacio´n de las Cajas
de Ahorros
(FUNCAS)
Tax pressure Revenue from regional direct taxes as % of
regional GDP
Fraction By region,
2001–2009
Regional Governments
Accounts and Bank of
Spain
Lawyers No. of lawyers inscribed in Bar associations
per 100 people
% By province,
2001–2009
Consejo General de la
Abogacia
Crime rate No. of convictions over population Fraction By province,
2001–2010
Consejo General del
Poder Judicial
PhD graduates No. of PhDs overpopulation Fraction By province,
2001–2010
Spanish National
Statistics Institute
(INE)
HHI Herfindahl–Hirschman index [0, 1] By province
and
industry,
2001–2009
SABI
27 We have computed the HHI with all the available firms in our
sample (890,000), i.e., we have included firms that entered or
exited the market during the period of study, in order to increase
the representativeness of the variable. We have computed two
versions of the HHI, one at the province-industry level—where
industry is defined at two digits using the NACE Rev. 1.1
classification—for the analysis of firm size and growth and one
at the province level for the analysis of business demography.
28 Extraordinary positions are revenues or expenses that do not
arise from the regular activities of a firm, such as insurance
claims.
29 Notice that, as it was explained in Sect. 3.3, criminal cases
are tried in separate courts than the civil cases that are analyzed
in this paper, so we do not expect congestion rates to be
influenced by the province’s degree of criminality.
legal services may help firms grow but it may also
congest the courts.
Finally, for the analysis of firm size and growth, we
also use two firm-level variables: the company’s age
and the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets
(tangibility). According to Berger and Udell (1995)
and Petersen and Rajan (1994), age captures the public
reputation of the firm. We test for the presence of
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max
Panel A: Firm-level variables
Employment 2,861,174 20.1 5.0 444.4 0 257,426
Real revenue 2,861,174 3.5 0.4 124.0 0.001 59,538.1
Age 2,861,174 13.0 11.0 8.7 1 481
Tangibility 2,855,325 0.3 0.2 0.3 0 1
Listed firms (%) 0.04
Limited liability firms (%) 99.97
Panel B: Province-level variables
Entry rate 450 10.88 10.48 3.08 5.75 53.98
Exit rate 450 9.49 9.12 2.23 4.45 24.70
Congestion rate (ordinary) 450 2.18 2.04 0.63 1.36 5.39
Congestion rate (verbal) 450 1.51 1.50 0.19 1.13 2.30
Congestion rate (monitory) 450 1.84 1.76 0.38 1.22 4.23
Congestion rate (exchange) 450 2.58 2.35 0.91 1.29 10.00
Congestion rate (executions) 450 4.06 3.83 1.36 1.47 14.26
GDP 450 17,973.43 10,620.11 27,686.95 1,448.74 193,049.50
GDP per capita 450 19.44 18.86 4.69 10.64 35.23
Unemployment rate 450 6.51 6.20 2.57 2.40 17.70
Credit/GDP 450 0.52 0.48 0.22 0.19 1.52
Npl ratio 450 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.16
Dar/GDP 450 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08
Branches per capita 450 10.50 10.23 2.61 5.41 18.54
Weight primary 450 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.23
Weight energy 450 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.18
Weight manufacturing 450 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.38
Weight construction 450 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.20
Weight market services 450 47.32 46.20 7.70 32.70 70.20
Weight non-market services 450 16.43 16.30 3.43 9.00 26.40
Capital intensity 450 161.36 150.70 66.33 54.52 560.53
Vertical Integration 450 0.37 0.37 0.02 0.31 0.44
Incorporation rate 450 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.19 0.51
Foreigners 450 7.11 5.25 5.33 0.57 24.41
Tax pressure 450 17.09 12.47 15.14 0.52 79.53
Lawyers 450 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.51
Crime rate 450 2.06 2.01 0.68 0.66 5.12
PhD graduates 450 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.00 1.70
HHI (province) 450 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.15
HHI (province-industry) 20,581 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.00 1.00
We have computed two versions of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI): HHI (province-industry) and HHI (province). The
former is computed at the province-industry level—where industry is defined at two digits using the NACE Rev. 1.1 classification—
while the latter is at the province level
nonlinear effects by including the square of age. As
tangible assets have more collateral value than intan-
gible assets, firms with high values of Tangibility may
have a lower cost of credit (Rajan and Zingales 1995;
Fabbri 2010).
Other factors such as the bankruptcy code, the labor
law, the level of protection of patent rights and
accounting standards have no relevance to this study
as they are set at the national level in Spain, so they
exhibit no geographical variation, while any nation-
wide change in these regulations will be captured by
the time dummies.
Table 1 provides a description of the variables used
in our analyses, distinguishing between firm-level
variables and province-level variables. Table 2 con-
tains some descriptive statistics on those variables and
other sample characteristics, while Table 3 shows the
sample’s industry distribution. We can see that the
median firm has five employees and it generates
revenue of 400,000 Euros, i.e., it is a very small firm.
However, the large standard deviations of those
variables and the right skewness of their distributions
require that those variables are analyzed in logarithm
form in our regression analyses. The median firm is
also 11 years old. Most firms in the sample are limited
liability unlisted companies. The sample covers all
relevant industries, with 28 % belonging to wholesale
and retail trade, 19 % to real estate, renting and
business activities, 18 % to manufacturing and 15 %
to construction.
4 Estimation strategy
4.1 Identification strategies
As it was discussed in the introduction, the main
caveat of previous studies is that they focus on the
impact of judicial enforcement on average firm size
without differentiating between the two possible
channels: the effect on the size and growth of
incumbent firms (intensive margin) and the effect on
entry and exit rates (extensive margin). We will also
differentiate between the efficacy of civil procedures
at the declaratory stage (i.e., when a debt is declared
and recognized by a judge) from those at the execution
stage (i.e., when the judge requires its payment), as the
assessment of the overall functioning of the judicial
system—as done by the previous literature—may be
misleading if only some procedures influence firm’s
behavior.
4.2 Analysis of the intensive margin: firm size
and firm growth
The analysis of the intensive margin is carried out by
regressing firm-level measures of firm size and growth
on province-level congestion ratios, a wide set of
controls, firm fixed effects and time dummies. For-
mally, it can be expressed as follows:
Table 3 Sample’s industry distribution (intensive margin)
Industry Obs. (%)
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry 68,447 2.4
B. Fishing 6,230 0.2
C. Mining and quarrying 11,941 0.4
D. Manufacturing 526,244 18.4
E. Electricity, gas and water supply 9,370 0.3
F. Construction 416,060 14.5
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of
motor vehicles, motorcycles and
personal and household goods
801,189 28.0
H. Hotels and restaurants 149,219 5.2
I. Transport, storage and communication 147,257 5.2
J. Financial intermediation 26,839 0.9
K. Real estate, renting and business
activities
546,582 19.1
M. Education 28,315 1.0
N. Health and social work 40,227 1.4
O. Other community, social and personal
service activities
83,254 2.9
Total 2,861,174 100
Industry classification: NACE Rev. 1.1
Table 4 Correlations of congestion rate (in logs) among the
different procedures
Ordinary Verbal Monitory Exchange Executions
Ordinary 1
Verbal 0.88 1
Monitory 0.78 0.72 1
Exchange 0.69 0.64 0.81 1
Executions 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.40 1
The table displays Pearson’s linear correlation coefficients
Yijt ¼ ai þ b Congestion ratejt; þ
XK
k¼1
dk Controlkjt
þ
XT#1
t¼1
ctdtþeijt
where Yijt is either firm size or firm’s growth
(measured in terms of employment or real revenue),
ai is firm fixed effects, Congestion ratejt is the measure
of judicial (in)efficacy (for the specific judicial
procedure considered in each case), Controlkit is a set
of K control variables, dt are time dummies and the
indices i, j, t refer to the firm, province and time period,
respectively.30
Our key regressor, the congestion rate, could be
interpreted as the ‘‘price’’ of the market for judicial
services, i.e., the observed court congestion in a
province in a certain year is the result of the supply of
judicial services being equal to its demand. Hence,
congestion rate is a function of supply and demand
factors. The key-identifying assumption is that, in the
case of Spain, the supply of judicial services is
exogenous to firms’ size and to firms’ decisions to
grow and enter/exit markets. If the supply of legal
services was determined by the companies’ and
individuals’ demand for justice in each province, we
should observe no or little variation in courts’
congestion across the 50 provinces, but Fig. 2a, b
shows considerable variation across them. More
remarkably, the most industrialized Spanish prov-
inces, which are those with larger firms and arguably
more litigation, exhibit very different levels of con-
gestion. While the Basque country provinces and
Navarra have low congestion rates, Barcelona has
intermediate levels and Madrid relatively high ones. A
potential explanation of those facts is that resources
are allocated according to the population size of each
province, a criterion that fails to take into account the
differences in the intensity of corporate litigation and
in the complexity of trials (Fabbri 2010; Mora-
Sanguinetti 2012a, b). Moreover, the courts consid-
ered in this study (‘‘juzgados de primera instancia’’
and ‘‘juzgados de primera instancia e instruccio´n’’) are
not specialized in corporate matters, as they also
resolve a wide range of conflicts that are totally
unrelated to corporate decisions (e.g., evictions,
inheritance conflicts). Thus, the distribution of those
courts is not likely to be influenced by the distribution
of conflicts relevant to firms’ decisions. Judges in
Spain are also obliged to process and resolve cases in
chronological order of entry, and therefore cannot give
preference to corporate conflicts over those between
individuals.
By contrast, the demand of judicial services may be
endogenous to firms’ size as larger firms may have a
higher propensity to litigate because of the fixed cost
component of judicial services,31 hence increasing
courts’ congestion. To overcome that identification
challenge, we undertake three different strategies.
First, size—either measured in terms of employment
or revenue—is set at the firm level in our regressions,
while the congestion rate and the controls are set at the
province level. Since the decision of a single firm to
litigate is likely to have a negligible impact on the
congestion of the courts of a whole province, that
design should alleviate endogeneity concerns.32 How-
ever, if there is a common shock that makes many
(large) firms in the same province to litigate at the
same time, then that identification strategy would not
solve the problem. Hence, the second strategy is to
use, for robustness, an alternative dependent variable,
firm’s growth, whose correlation with firm size is quite
modest (0.22 and 0.16 in terms of revenue and
employment, respectively). The use of that variable
also has the advantage of allowing for a direct test of
the effect of judicial efficacy on firm’s growth. The
third strategy, following Giacomelli and Menon
30 The above regressions are estimated via the within-group
estimator with clustered standard errors robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation. The fixed effects have been found
jointly significant via cross-section poolability tests, while serial
correlation has been found using the test of Wooldridge (2002).
Results of both tests are available upon request.
31 For instance, most large corporations have their legal
departments, while small businesses may choose to keep a
lawyer or a staff of lawyers on retainer or hire them when their
services are required.
32 In general, decisions at the firm level are not likely to affect
judicial efficacy, macroeconomic performance or the provision
of credit.
Table 5 Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on firm size and growth: employment
Variables Log (employment) Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (congestion
ordinary)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.020***
(0.004)
-0.016***
(0.004)
-0.015***
(0.004)
-0.053***
(0.003)
-0.049***
(0.003)
-0.027***
(0.004)
-0.028***
(0.004)
Log (age) 0.158***
(0.005)
0.158***
(0.005)
0.158***
(0.005)
-0.118***
(0.004)
-0.118***
(0.004)
-0.118***
(0.004)
Log (age)2 0.010***
(0.003)
0.009***
(0.003)
0.009***
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.006)
Tangibility 0.027***
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.003)
-0.027***
(0.002)
-0.027***
(0.002)
-0.027***
(0.002)
Log (GDP) 0.133***
(0.020)
0.125***
(0.020)
0.015
(0.015)
0.023
(0.015)
Log (unemployment
rate)
-0.058***
(0.004)
-0.054***
(0.004)
-0.035***
(0.003)
-0.039***
(0.003)
Credit/GDP 0.026***
(0.004)
0.026***
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
Npl ratio -0.275***
(0.023)
-0.300***
(0.024)
-0.121***
(0.021)
-0.095***
(0.022)
Dar/GDP -0.247***
(0.081)
-0.286***
(0.081)
-0.327***
(0.085)
-0.301***
(0.085)
Branches -0.013***
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.002)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.009***
(0.001)
Weight energy 0.410***
(0.093)
0.409***
(0.093)
0.114
(0.070)
0.124*
(0.070)
Weight manufacturing 0.429***
(0.062)
0.451***
(0.062)
0.111**
(0.045)
0.104**
(0.045)
Weight construction 0.622***
(0.062)
0.634***
(0.062)
0.135***
(0.048)
0.133***
(0.048)
Weight market
services
0.549***
(0.059)
0.548***
(0.059)
0.074
(0.047)
0.088*
(0.047)
Weight non-market
services
0.070
(0.070)
0.108
(0.070)
0.088
(0.057)
0.065
(0.058)
Log (capital intensity) -0.018***
(0.003)
-0.018***
(0.003)
-0.016***
(0.003)
-0.016***
(0.003)
Vertical integration -0.454***
(0.063)
-0.447***
(0.063)
-0.156***
(0.053)
-0.159***
(0.053)
Incorporation rate 0.072*
(0.038)
0.074*
(0.038)
-0.066**
(0.029)
-0.070**
(0.029)
Foreigners -0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Log (tax pressure) -0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.028***
(0.003)
-0.029***
(0.003)
Crime rate 0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
(2013),33 consists of controlling for differences in
litigation intensity across provinces by adding the
variable Lawyers in some specifications. Finally, in
the event that those strategies did not totally remove
the reverse-causality bias, we know the sign of such a
bias: we would find a positive correlation between
firm size/growth and court congestion. By contrast,
since our estimates show a negative relation between
firm size/growth and court congestion (see Sect. 5),
either that bias does not exist or it is not large enough
to offset the causal effect of judicial enforcement on
firm size/growth. In other words, our estimates provide
the lower bound of the true causal effect.
Another identification challenge is that firms’
locations are endogenous and may depend on factors
such as the efficacy of judicial procedures. In such a
case, if firms prefer regions with more effective courts
and larger firms benefit more from such courts because
of their higher demand for judicial services (or their
lower costs of changing their location), then part of the
relationship between firm size and judicial efficacy
could be due to an ‘‘attraction effect’’ rather than a
‘‘growth-enhancing effect.’’However, our identification
strategy rules out this potential source of bias by
eliminating firms that entered or exited the market
during the period of study.
4.3 Analysis of the extensive margin: entry
and exit rates
In order to study the potential impact of the different
judicial procedures on the decisions of firms to enter or
exit a market, we regress entry and exit rates on (the log
of) congestion rate of each procedure, a set of province-
level controls, time dummies and province fixed effects.
The controls are the same as in the previous analyses,
with the exception of incorporation ratio, which is
excluded because it would be an endogenous regressor
by construction. Entry and exit rates are expressed in
logs to correct for right skewness. Formally, the analysis
can be expressed as follows:
Wjt ¼ aj þ b Congestion ratejt; þ
XK
k¼1
dk Controlkjt
þ
XT#1
t¼1
ctdtþejt
where Wjt is either the entry rate or the exit rate, aj is
province fixed effects, Congestion ratejt is the measure
of judicial inefficacy (for the specific type of judicial
procedure considered in each case), Controlkit is a set of
Table 5 continued
Variables Log (employment) Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
PhD graduates 0.004
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
0.005
(0.005)
0.007
(0.005)
Log (HHI) -0.012***
(0.001)
-0.012***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.001)
Lawyers 0.184***
(0.053)
-0.187***
(0.042)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,861,174 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,274,990 2,271,386 2,271,386 2,271,386
No. of firms 460,170 458,189 458,189 458,189 435,204 433,558 433,558 433,558
R2 (within) 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015
The dependent variable is the log of total employment in regressions (1)–(4) and the annual employment growth in regressions (5)–
(8). All regressions include a constant. ‘‘Npl’’ stands for non-performing loans and ‘‘Dar’’ for defaulted accounts receivable. ‘‘HHI’’ is
the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The ‘‘within R2’’ is the
R2 from the mean-deviated regression
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
33 Although Giacomelli and Menon (2013) use a different
variable, a litigation index, their aim is the same: to account for
potential reverse-causality issues between size and judicial
efficacy.
Table 6 Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on firm size and growth: real revenue
Variables Log (revenue) Revenue growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (congestion
ordinary)
-0.044***
(0.006)
-0.052***
(0.006)
-0.032***
(0.006)
-0.031***
(0.006)
-0.066***
(0.006)
-0.057***
(0.006)
-0.026***
(0.007)
-0.026***
(0.007)
Log (age) 0.400***
(0.008)
0.402***
(0.008)
0.402***
(0.008)
-0.297***
(0.007)
-0.296***
(0.007)
-0.296***
(0.007)
Log (age)2 -0.066***
(0.004)
-0.068***
(0.004)
-0.068***
(0.004)
0.034***
(0.009)
0.035***
(0.009)
0.036***
(0.009)
Tangibility -0.149***
(0.004)
-0.150***
(0.004)
-0.150***
(0.004)
-0.152***
(0.004)
-0.153***
(0.004)
-0.153***
(0.004)
Log (GDP) 0.183***
(0.031)
0.175***
(0.031)
-0.045*
(0.024)
-0.040
(0.025)
Log (unemployment
rate)
-0.208***
(0.006)
-0.204***
(0.007)
-0.097***
(0.005)
-0.101***
(0.006)
Credit/GDP 0.047***
(0.006)
0.047***
(0.006)
-0.011**
(0.004)
-0.010**
(0.004)
Npl ratio -0.458***
(0.039)
-0.484***
(0.040)
-0.104***
(0.037)
-0.087**
(0.039)
Dar/GDP -0.420***
(0.129)
-0.460***
(0.129)
-0.694***
(0.135)
-0.676***
(0.135)
Branches -0.035***
(0.002)
-0.035***
(0.002)
-0.023***
(0.002)
-0.023***
(0.002)
Weight energy 0.785***
(0.138)
0.784***
(0.138)
-0.021
(0.111)
-0.015
(0.111)
Weight manufacturing 0.577***
(0.094)
0.600***
(0.094)
0.087
(0.073)
0.082
(0.073)
Weight construction 1.614***
(0.095)
1.627***
(0.095)
-0.226***
(0.078)
-0.228***
(0.078)
Weight market
services
1.359***
(0.089)
1.359***
(0.089)
-0.149**
(0.075)
-0.140*
(0.075)
Weight non-market
services
0.225**
(0.106)
0.265**
(0.106)
-0.096
(0.091)
-0.112
(0.091)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.004
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.013***
(0.004)
Vertical integration -1.107***
(0.099)
-1.099***
(0.099)
-0.537***
(0.092)
-0.539***
(0.092)
Incorporation rate 0.207***
(0.057)
0.209***
(0.057)
-0.065
(0.047)
-0.068
(0.047)
Foreigners -0.002**
(0.001)
-0.001**
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.001)
Log (tax pressure) 0.004*
(0.002)
0.004*
(0.002)
-0.034***
(0.005)
-0.035***
(0.005)
Crime rate 0.009***
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.004**
(0.002)
K control variables, dt are time dummies and the
indices i, j, t refer to the firm, province and time period,
respectively.34
The identification strategy relies on the time
dummies and the province fixed effects to ensure
unbiased estimates. First, the entry and exit rates, the
procedural congestion rate, measures of macroeco-
nomic performance (GDP, unemployment) and prox-
ies of credit conditions (e.g., credit to GDP, non-
performing loans ratio) are expected to be correlated
along the business cycle. By including time dummies,
we control for this common factor. Second, entry rates
and economic development are jointly determined by
institutional factors and, more specifically, by regula-
tions on entry (Djankov et al. 2002; Klapper et al.
2004). In Spain, an important part of the regulations
governing entry (e.g., company’s registration,
licenses) lies within the competence of the regions
(Comunidades Auto´nomas) (Mora-Sanguinetti and
Fuentes 2012a, b). A region may comprise one or
more provinces. Since entry regulations and, in
general, institutions, change slowly over time, the
province fixed effects may capture them quite accu-
rately in a short time period like the one used in our
sample (2001–2009). Finally, since the main regula-
tions governing exit, the labor law and the bankruptcy
code, are set at the national level, we do not expect
institutional factors to determine the geographical
variation of entry rates, while any nationwide change
in these laws would be captured by the time dummies.
Moreover, we are not concerned about reverse-
causality problems because the supply of judicial
services is exogenous (see discussion in previous
section), and we do not expect the demand for the
specific judicial procedures analyzed in this paper to
be influenced by entry and exit rates, as conflicts
related with companies’ entries or exits are generally
solved in courts different from the general civil courts
from which our data are drawn (juzgados de primera
instancia, juzgados de primera instancia e instruc-
cio´n). In the case of the (rare) conflicts regarding entry,
those will be solved in the administrative courts, as it is
the public administrations’ role to check that a firm
meets all the requirements to begin its business
activities. In the case of conflicts regarding exit, those
concerning layoffs are resolved by the employment
Table 6 continued
Variables Log (revenue) Revenue growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
PhD graduates 0.016**
(0.007)
0.013*
(0.007)
0.007
(0.010)
0.008
(0.010)
Log (HHI) -0.035***
(0.002)
-0.035***
(0.002)
-0.016***
(0.001)
-0.016***
(0.001)
Lawyers 0.194**
(0.082)
-0.127*
(0.070)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,861,174 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,274,990 2,271,386 2,271,386 2,271,386
No. of firms 460,170 458,189 458,189 458,189 435,204 433,558 433,558 433,558
R2 (within) 0.026 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.030
The dependent variable is the log of real revenue in regressions (1)–(4) and the annual real revenue growth in regressions (5)–(8). All
regressions include a constant. ‘‘Npl’’ stands for non-performing loans and ‘‘Dar’’ for defaulted accounts receivable. ‘‘HHI’’ is the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The ‘‘within R2’’ is the R2
from the mean-deviated regression
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
34 The above regressions are estimated via the within-group
estimator with clustered standard errors robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation. The fixed effects have been found
jointly significant via cross-section poolability tests, while
cross-section correlation has been rejected using Pesaran’s CD
test (2004). While the Wooldridge’s test (2002) has not been
able to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, note
that the power of this test may be low when N is small, as it is in
this case (N = 50). Drukker (2003) finds high power for
samples between N = 500 and N = 1,000 and between T = 5
and T = 10.
tribunals (juzgados de lo social) while bankruptcy
procedures are tried in specialized mercantile courts
(juzgados de lo mercantil) since 2004.35 In any case, if
exit rates had some impact on court congestion, we
again know the sign of reverse-causality bias: we
should expect a positive correlation between the two
variables. By contrast, our estimates show a nonsig-
nificant (negative) relationship between the two (see
Sect. 5).
5 Results
We have carried out empirical analyses for each type
of procedure (ordinary, verbal, monitory, exchange
and executions). For brevity of exposition, we only
display in the following sections the results for the
representative declaratory judgment (ordinary judg-
ment) and the executory judgment. The results corre-
sponding to verbal judgments (see online Appendix B)
and monitory and exchange—available upon are
request—are similar to those for ordinary judgments.
We expect the different types of declaratory
judgments (ordinary, verbal, monitory and exchange)
to have a very similar impact on firm size. Executory
judgments, however, as explained in Sect. 3.1, have a
different nature and take place later than declaratory
judgments. The correlations of our key variable
congestion rate among those procedures corroborate
this argument. As we can observe in Table 4, execu-
tions are lowly correlated with the rest of procedures,
while all types of declaratory judgments are highly
correlated among each other, with correlations ranging
between 0.7 and 0.8 in most cases.
5.1 Analysis of the intensive margin
5.1.1 Ordinary judgments
We commence the analysis with ordinary judgments
because, as discussed in Sect. 3.1, they are considered
the most relevant civil procedures for companies. We
run several regressions where the dependent variable
is either firm size or firm growth.Wemeasure firm size
by total employment or real revenue (both of them in
logs) and firm growth by the annual growth rate of
those variables. Our key regressor is the (log)
congestion rate of ordinary judgments (congestion
ordinary). Some of the controls are also in logs to
correct for right skewness. We show four different
specifications for each dependent variable. Specifica-
tion (1) only includes congestion ordinary, firm fixed
effects and time dummies. Specification (2) adds to (1)
some firm-level controls. Specification (3) adds to (2)
a large set of province-level controls. Specification (4)
also includes the variable Lawyers.36
The results are displayed in Tables 5 and 6.
Congestion ordinary always has a highly significant
and negative coefficient, suggesting that judicial
(in)efficacy has a negative impact on firm size and
hampers firm growth.37 The estimated elasticities and
semi-elasticities are larger—in absolute terms—when
size is measured in terms of revenue, suggesting that
the inefficacy of the judicial system may deter more
sales than hiring staff. The controls’ coefficients, when
significant, usually have the expected sign.38
35 The current bankruptcy law (Ley Concursal), which entered
into force in September 2004, stipulated the creation of new
courts (mercantile courts) that would be specialized in bank-
ruptcy procedures. The procedures prior to that law were solved
in the general civil courts.
36 Correlations among the regressors (see online Appendix C)
suggest that there are no multicollinearity problems except for
the case of Lawyers, which is highly correlated with GDP (0.81).
In a number of experiments, we have tried other specifications,
such as dropping some proxies for credit constraints and
replacing GDP by GDP per capita. The size and significance of
the coefficient on congestion rate was very similar. Results
available upon request.
37 All the regressions in this section have a very low R2,
between 1 and 4 %. This is because most regressors, with the
exception of age and tangibility, are province-level variables
that attempt to explain the variation of a firm-level-dependent
variable. We are not worried about this result because our main
goal is to assess the effect of judicial efficacy via consistent
estimates. Moreover, the use of the within-group estimator,
rather than the least squares dummy variable estimator, to
control for firm-level fixed effects, yields identical estimations
of the coefficients but a much lower R2. We have chosen the
former because it is much less computationally expensive.
38 Two apparently striking results are, however, the negative
coefficient on Foreigners and the positive one on crime rate,
which contradict the findings of Giacomelli and Menon (2013).
The reason is that the effect of those variables is very sensitive to
the specific controls that are included in the regressions. In
robustness checks—see online Appendix G—we have run the
same regressions but substituting log (GDP per capita) for log
(GDP). Then, the coefficient on Foreigners becomes positive
and that on crime rate is insignificant or negative in most
specifications.
Table 7 Impact of judicial efficacy (executory judgments) on firm size and growth: employment
Variables Log (employment) Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (congestion
executions)
-0.002***
(0.000)
-0.003***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Log (age) 0.158***
(0.005)
0.158***
(0.005)
0.158***
(0.005)
-0.148***
(0.008)
-0.151***
(0.008)
-0.151***
(0.008)
Log (age)2 0.010***
(0.003)
0.009***
(0.003)
0.009***
(0.003)
0.023***
(0.003)
0.025***
(0.003)
0.025***
(0.003)
Tangibility 0.027***
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.003)
-0.027***
(0.002)
-0.027***
(0.002)
-0.027***
(0.002)
Log (GDP) 0.138***
(0.020)
0.130***
(0.020)
0.022
(0.015)
0.030**
(0.015)
Log (unemployment rate) -0.059***
(0.004)
-0.054***
(0.004)
-0.038***
(0.003)
-0.042***
(0.003)
Credit/GDP 0.026***
(0.004)
0.025***
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
Npl ratio -0.271***
(0.023)
-0.297***
(0.024)
-0.118***
(0.021)
-0.093***
(0.022)
Dar/GDP -0.294***
(0.081)
-0.330***
(0.081)
-0.406***
(0.084)
-0.382***
(0.084)
Branches -0.013***
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.002)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.010***
(0.001)
Weight energy 0.360***
(0.093)
0.363***
(0.093)
0.037
(0.069)
0.045
(0.069)
Weight manufacturing 0.379***
(0.061)
0.405***
(0.061)
0.036
(0.044)
0.029
(0.044)
Weight construction 0.603***
(0.063)
0.617***
(0.063)
0.130***
(0.048)
0.127***
(0.048)
Weight market services 0.517***
(0.059)
0.519***
(0.059)
0.048
(0.047)
0.059
(0.047)
Weight non-market
services
0.042
(0.070)
0.084
(0.070)
0.041
(0.057)
0.020
(0.057)
Log (capital intensity) -0.019***
(0.003)
-0.019***
(0.003)
-0.018***
(0.003)
-0.018***
(0.003)
Vertical integration -0.401***
(0.063)
-0.398***
(0.063)
-0.071
(0.052)
-0.071
(0.052)
Incorporation rate 0.065*
(0.038)
0.067*
(0.038)
-0.086***
(0.029)
-0.090***
(0.029)
Foreigners -0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Log (tax pressure) -0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.029***
(0.003)
-0.031***
(0.003)
Crime rate 0.004***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
We can evaluate the economic significance of the
effect by means of a simple hypothetical experiment.
Attributing to the province with the worst judicial
efficacy the best law enforcement in our sample,39 the
relative increase40 in firm size would range between a
0.6 and a 2.8 %, while annual firm growth would rise
between 1.1 and 2.8 % points.41 Hence, the effect on
size is quite modest, while the effect on growth is quite
remarkable, especially considering that the average
growth rate for the period 2002–2009 was -3.1 and
0.1 % in terms of revenue and employment,
respectively.42
The main result of the analysis of verbal judgments
(displayed in online Appendix B) is the same as in the
case of ordinary judgments: judicial inefficacy has a
negative impact on firm size and growth, which is
robust to all specifications.43
5.1.2 Executory judgements
The results for the analysis of the executory judgments
are displayed in Tables 7 and 8. In the case of firm
size, the coefficient on congestion executions is
always negative and statistically significant. However,
it is very small in comparison with the analogous
coefficient in the regressions for ordinary judgments.
In the case of firm growth, the coefficient is never
significant. These results indicate that judicial efficacy
in executory judgments is not a robust determinant of
firm size and firm growth.
A possible interpretation of these findings is that
firms make their business decisions solely based on
their expectations about the quality of legal enforce-
ment in the first—and usually the only—stage of the
process (the declaratory judgment) (see Fig. 1), which
mainly corresponds to ordinary (or verbal, exchange,
Table 7 continued
Variables Log (employment) Employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
PhD graduates 0.004
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
0.004
(0.005)
0.006
(0.005)
Log (HHI) -0.012***
(0.001)
-0.012***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.001)
Lawyers 0.189***
(0.053)
-0.174***
(0.042)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,861,174 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,274,990 2,271,386 2,271,386 2,271,386
No. of firms 460,170 458,189 458,189 458,189 435,204 433,558 433,558 433,558
R2 (within) 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015
The dependent variable is the log of total employment in regressions (1)–(4) and the annual employment growth in regressions (5)–
(8). All regressions include a constant. ‘‘Npl’’ stands for non-performing loans and ‘‘Dar’’ for defaulted accounts receivable. ‘‘HHI’’ is
the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The ‘‘within R2’’ is the
R2 from the mean-deviated regression
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
39 The province with the best law enforcement (i.e., lowest
value of congestion ratio) is Alava, with an average value of
1.65 for the period 2001–2009, while the province with the
worst law enforcement (i.e., highest value of congestion ratio) is
Alicante, with an average value of 2.80 for the same period.
Therefore, the simulated change amounts to (1.65 -
2.80) 9 100/2.80 = -41.2 %.
40 By relative change, we mean 100 9 [X(1) - X(0)]/X(0),
where X(0) and X(1) are the initial and final values, respectively.
41 Here, we mean a change in the level of the growth rate, a
variable expressed in percentage, i.e., X(1) - X(0), where X(0)
and X(1) are the initial and final values, respectively.
42 As we control for credit availability in our regressions, we
expect those figures to be the lower bound of the total impact of
judicial efficacy on firm size and growth, since previous
literature has found a positive impact of judicial efficacy on
credit availability (see Sect. 2).
43 The analyses of monitory and exchange—available upon
request—also yield the same conclusion.
Table 8 Impact of judicial efficacy (executory judgments) on firm size and growth: real revenue
Variables Log (revenue) Revenue growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (congestion
executions)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.001*
(0.001)
-0.001*
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
Log (age) 0.401***
(0.008)
0.402***
(0.008)
0.402***
(0.008)
-0.429***
(0.013)
-0.432***
(0.013)
-0.432***
(0.013)
Log (age)2 -0.066***
(0.004)
-0.068***
(0.004)
-0.068***
(0.004)
0.093***
(0.005)
0.095***
(0.005)
0.095***
(0.005)
Tangibility -0.149***
(0.004)
-0.150***
(0.004)
-0.151***
(0.004)
-0.153***
(0.004)
-0.153***
(0.004)
-0.153***
(0.004)
Log (GDP) 0.193***
(0.030)
0.183***
(0.030)
-0.039
(0.024)
-0.034
(0.025)
Log (unemployment rate) -0.210***
(0.006)
-0.205***
(0.007)
-0.100***
(0.005)
-0.103***
(0.006)
Credit/GDP 0.048***
(0.006)
0.047***
(0.006)
-0.010**
(0.004)
-0.009**
(0.004)
Npl ratio -0.453***
(0.039)
-0.482***
(0.040)
-0.102***
(0.037)
-0.086**
(0.039)
Dar/GDP -0.530***
(0.129)
-0.570***
(0.129)
-0.774***
(0.134)
-0.758***
(0.134)
Branches -0.035***
(0.002)
-0.035***
(0.002)
-0.023***
(0.002)
-0.024***
(0.002)
Weight energy 0.674***
(0.138)
0.678***
(0.138)
-0.095
(0.110)
-0.090
(0.110)
Weight manufacturing 0.462***
(0.092)
0.491***
(0.093)
0.009
(0.071)
0.004
(0.071)
Weight construction 1.584***
(0.095)
1.600***
(0.095)
-0.236***
(0.078)
-0.238***
(0.078)
Weight market services 1.304***
(0.089)
1.307***
(0.089)
-0.180**
(0.074)
-0.173**
(0.074)
Weight non-market
services
0.161
(0.105)
0.208**
(0.106)
-0.148*
(0.090)
-0.163*
(0.091)
Log (capital intensity) -0.005
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.015***
(0.004)
-0.015***
(0.004)
Vertical integration -1.001***
(0.098)
-0.997***
(0.098)
-0.453***
(0.089)
-0.452***
(0.089)
Incorporation rate 0.188***
(0.057)
0.190***
(0.057)
-0.084*
(0.046)
-0.086*
(0.046)
Foreigners -0.002**
(0.001)
-0.001**
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.001)
Log (tax pressure) 0.004
(0.002)
0.004*
(0.002)
-0.036***
(0.005)
-0.037***
(0.005)
Crime rate 0.010***
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
monitory) judgments. In other words, the enterprise
does not take into account the efficacy of resolution of
executory judgments, because the ruling of the judge
in that first step is generally sufficient to make the
contracting parties abide by their obligations. There
may be several explanations for this: penalties for
delayed payment, risk aversion (even if the probability
of punishment is small, individuals may suffer from a
disutility higher than the expected punishment),
internalization of social values (the ‘‘right’’ thing to
do is to abide by the law, once there is a ruling against
the company) and reputation (there is an immediate
damage to the reputation of the company when it loses
a trial, whether or not it decides to comply with the
obligations imposed in the judgment). Regarding the
first argument (penalties for delayed payment), the
Spanish procedural law establishes that, immediately
after a judgment that compels the debtor to pay off a
sum of money, the debt will accrue interest.44
Therefore, this rule discourages the debtor to delay
the payment and to cause the need of an executory
judgment.
Regardless of the underlying factors, these results
highlight the importance of taking into account the
type of procedure when studying the link between firm
size and growth and judicial efficacy. The difference
between the procedures is important not only for
businesses but also for the public administration, as it
has to optimize its investments in the judicial system.
5.2 Analysis of the extensive margin
5.2.1 Ordinary judgments
The impact of judicial (in)efficacy on entry and exit
rates, in the case of the ordinary judgments, is
displayed in Table 9. The coefficient on congestion
ordinary is negative and statistically significant in all
the regressions where the dependent variable is the
(log) entry rate, while it is never statistically different
from zero when the dependent variable is the (log) exit
rate.45 The controls’ coefficients, when significant,
usually have the expected sign, although most of them
Table 8 continued
Variables Log (revenue) Revenue growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
PhD graduates 0.014**
(0.007)
0.012
(0.007)
0.006
(0.010)
0.008
(0.010)
Log (HHI) -0.035***
(0.002)
-0.035***
(0.002)
-0.016***
(0.001)
-0.016***
(0.001)
Lawyers 0.212***
(0.082)
-0.117*
(0.070)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,861,174 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,274,990 2,271,386 2,271,386 2,271,386
No. of firms 460,170 458,009 458,009 458,009 435,204 433,558 433,558 433,558
R2 (within) 0.026 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.030
The dependent variable is the log of real revenue in regressions (1)–(4) and the annual real revenue growth in regressions (5)–(8). All
regressions include a constant. ‘‘Npl’’ stands for non-performing loans and ‘‘Dar’’ for defaulted accounts receivable. ‘‘HHI’’ is the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The ‘‘within R2’’ is the R2
from the mean-deviated regression
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
44 The interest rate applicable as punishment payment depends
on the type of debt but it is, in any case, quite high. For example,
the general punitive/judicial interest rate imposed as a result of
court proceedings condemning payment of cash amounts is the
legal interest rate (4 % in 2014) plus two percentage points, i.e.,
6 %. Article 576 of the Civil Procedural Law.
45 The results are robust to specifying the dependent variables
without the logarithmic transformation. Results available upon
request.
Table 9 Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on entry and exit rates
Variables Log (entry rate) Log (exit rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (congestion ordinary) -0.159*
(0.080)
-0.175**
(0.073)
-0.173**
(0.072)
-0.170**
(0.072)
-0.003
(0.133)
-0.042
(0.114)
-0.038
(0.115)
-0.042
(0.114)
Log (GDP) -0.131
(0.338)
-0.136
(0.342)
-0.200
(0.272)
-0.210
(0.272)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.213**
(0.082)
-0.209**
(0.079)
-0.199**
(0.084)
0.098
(0.060)
0.107
(0.066)
0.074
(0.075)
Credit/GDP 0.086
(0.085)
0.084
(0.085)
0.082
(0.082)
0.038
(0.064)
0.035
(0.063)
0.024
(0.058)
Npl ratio -0.234
(0.295)
-0.271
(0.302)
-0.260
(0.296)
0.152
(0.334)
0.077
(0.337)
0.036
(0.331)
Dar/GDP -1.011
(1.985)
-1.057
(2.025)
-0.994
(2.028)
-0.514
(2.118)
-0.605
(2.091)
-0.732
(2.070)
Branches -0.016
(0.030)
-0.016
(0.030)
-0.019
(0.027)
0.038*
(0.020)
0.038*
(0.020)
0.040**
(0.020)
Weight energy 0.254
(0.863)
0.236
(0.873)
0.220
(0.818)
1.029
(0.976)
0.994
(0.996)
1.203
(1.019)
Weight manufacturing 0.272
(0.718)
0.279
(0.718)
0.313
(0.731)
0.796
(0.835)
0.809
(0.843)
0.934
(0.832)
Weight construction 0.135
(0.708)
0.151
(0.702)
0.083
(0.721)
0.778
(0.846)
0.812
(0.857)
1.039
(0.871)
Weight market services 0.981
(0.681)
0.985
(0.684)
1.058
(0.763)
0.384
(0.611)
0.392
(0.615)
0.504
(0.584)
Weight non-market services 1.979*
(1.171)
2.032*
(1.194)
2.008
(1.221)
0.776
(0.885)
0.883
(0.905)
1.027
(0.918)
Log (capital intensity) 0.081*
(0.047)
0.078*
(0.045)
0.078*
(0.045)
0.081
(0.049)
0.077
(0.051)
0.077
(0.050)
Vertical integration 0.368
(1.834)
0.340
(1.800)
0.371
(1.803)
-0.893
(0.951)
-0.948
(0.960)
-1.042
(0.979)
Foreigners 0.008
(0.007)
0.008
(0.009)
0.008
(0.008)
0.018**
(0.007)
0.020***
(0.007)
0.015**
(0.006)
Log (tax pressure) 0.018
(0.035)
0.019
(0.034)
0.018
(0.036)
0.086**
(0.037)
0.087**
(0.037)
0.082**
(0.037)
Crime rate -0.013
(0.033)
-0.013
(0.033)
-0.013
(0.033)
0.018
(0.029)
0.018
(0.028)
0.019
(0.029)
PhD graduates -0.070
(0.100)
-0.071
(0.102)
-0.073
(0.103)
-0.024
(0.148)
-0.027
(0.148)
-0.021
(0.150)
Log (HHI) -0.013
(0.022)
-0.013
(0.022)
-0.013
(0.022)
-0.027
(0.016)
-0.027
(0.016)
-0.027
(0.016)
Lawyers 0.404
(0.903)
0.368
(0.915)
0.816
(1.142)
0.894
(1.136)
Log (GDP per capita) 0.066
(0.283)
-0.405
(0.283)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
are insignificant, probably because their impact is
picked up by the province fixed effects.
Those results suggest that judicial efficacy in
ordinary judgments promotes entry and has no effect
on exit. We can estimate the size of the effect using the
same experiment as in the cases of firm size and
growth. Attributing to the province with the worst
judicial efficacy the best law enforcement in our
sample, the relative increase in its entry rate would
range between an 8.8 and a 9.5 %. Hence, the effect is
not only statistically significant but also economically
relevant.46
Therefore, it seems that judicial efficacy in ordinary
judgments influences average firm size through two
different channels. On the one hand, it fosters the
growth of incumbents, which increases average firm
size. On the other hand, it also promotes entry and,
since entrants are generally smaller, it decreases
average firm size. The overall effect, as found in
previous literature, seems to be positive. More impor-
tant, while those channels have opposite effects on
average firm size, both have a positive impact on the
economy, since both larger firms and higher entry rates
are associated with more innovation and higher
productivity growth.
5.2.2 Executory judgments
The impact of judicial (in)efficacy on entry and exit
rates in the case of the executory judgments is
displayed in Table 10. The coefficient on congestion
executions is never statistically different from zero.47
Hence, judicial efficacy in executions has no effect on
either entry or exit.
6 Conclusions
Previous literature has found that the quality of the
legal system and, specifically, the aggregate effec-
tiveness of courts have a positive effect on average
firm size within a country. This paper goes a step
further in two different (but complementary)
directions.
First, it disentangles the impact of the different
judicial procedures on average firm size between two
possible channels: the effect on the growth of incum-
bent firms (intensive margin) and the effect on entry
and exit rates (extensive margin). The identification of
the specific channel is crucial in order to draw the
correct policy implications, as entrants are generally
much smaller than incumbents, but both high entry
rates and high firm growth are associated with higher
productivity growth and innovation. To put it differ-
ently, higher average firm size is not always desirable,
as it could reflect sclerotic markets characterized by
low entry and exit rates rather than by high-growth
Table 9 continued
Variables Log (entry rate) Log (exit rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
No. of provinces 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R2 (within) 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.51
The dependent variable is the log of entry rate in regressions (1)–(4) and the log of exit rate in regressions (5)–(8). All regressions
include a constant. ‘‘Npl’’ stands for non-performing loans and ‘‘Dar’’ for defaulted accounts receivable. ‘‘HHI’’ is the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index at the province level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The ‘‘within R2’’ is the R2 from the mean-
deviated regression
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
46 As we control for credit availability in our regressions, we
expect those figures to be the lower bound of the total impact of
judicial efficacy on entry rates, since previous literature has
found a positive impact of judicial efficacy on credit availability
(see Sect. 2).
47 The results are robust to specifying the dependent variables
without the logarithmic transformation. Results available upon
request.
Table 10 Impact of judicial efficacy (executory judgments) on entry and exit rates
Variables Log (entry rate) Log (exit rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (congestion executions) -0.002
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.005)
Log (GDP) -0.088
(0.345)
-0.096
(0.349)
-0.188
(0.277)
-0.200
(0.278)
Log (unemployment rate) -0.215**
(0.085)
-0.208**
(0.081)
-0.195**
(0.087)
0.097
(0.061)
0.107
(0.066)
0.073
(0.076)
Credit/GDP 0.090
(0.088)
0.088
(0.087)
0.088
(0.085)
0.037
(0.066)
0.034
(0.064)
0.023
(0.061)
Npl ratio -0.263
(0.303)
-0.315
(0.314)
-0.299
(0.307)
0.150
(0.331)
0.073
(0.335)
0.033
(0.329)
Dar/GDP -1.248
(2.122)
-1.308
(2.172)
-1.229
(2.167)
-0.546
(2.059)
-0.635
(2.027)
-0.759
(2.004)
Branches -0.015
(0.030)
-0.016
(0.030)
-0.019
(0.028)
0.039*
(0.021)
0.038*
(0.020)
0.040**
(0.020)
Weight energy -0.233
(0.852)
-0.248
(0.861)
-0.284
(0.818)
0.940
(0.917)
0.917
(0.933)
1.120
(0.946)
Weight manufacturing -0.146
(0.692)
-0.128
(0.696)
-0.106
(0.697)
0.705
(0.822)
0.730
(0.831)
0.843
(0.826)
Weight construction 0.071
(0.706)
0.096
(0.702)
0.004
(0.728)
0.754
(0.836)
0.790
(0.848)
1.011
(0.865)
Weight market services 0.696
(0.657)
0.707
(0.662)
0.764
(0.742)
0.314
(0.592)
0.331
(0.596)
0.429
(0.566)
Weight non-market services 1.563
(1.142)
1.646
(1.164)
1.612
(1.185)
0.680
(0.882)
0.804
(0.911)
0.938
(0.925)
Log (capital intensity) 0.079*
(0.046)
0.076*
(0.045)
0.075
(0.045)
0.081
(0.049)
0.076
(0.051)
0.076
(0.050)
Vertical integration 0.750
(1.954)
0.703
(1.905)
0.737
(1.906)
-0.806
(0.959)
-0.874
(0.970)
-0.960
(0.990)
Foreigners 0.007
(0.008)
0.008
(0.009)
0.009
(0.008)
0.018**
(0.007)
0.020***
(0.007)
0.015**
(0.006)
Log (tax pressure) 0.018
(0.036)
0.018
(0.036)
0.018
(0.038)
0.085**
(0.038)
0.086**
(0.038)
0.081**
(0.037)
Crime rate -0.007
(0.032)
-0.008
(0.032)
-0.008
(0.032)
0.019
(0.029)
0.018
(0.028)
0.020
(0.028)
PhD graduates -0.076
(0.102)
-0.078
(0.105)
-0.081
(0.106)
-0.026
(0.148)
-0.029
(0.147)
-0.023
(0.149)
Log (HHI) -0.015
(0.024)
-0.015
(0.024)
-0.015
(0.024)
-0.028
(0.017)
-0.027
(0.017)
-0.028
(0.017)
Log (GDP per capita) 0.575
(0.911)
0.527
(0.921)
0.853
(1.111)
0.936
(1.110)
Lawyers 0.115
(0.283)
-0.400
(0.290)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
firms. In this paper, we find that judicial efficacy
fosters the size and growth of incumbents and that it
also promotes entry, while it has no impact on firms’
exits. Hence, increasing judicial efficacy would be
welfare-improving, regardless on its impact on aver-
age firm size. This is particularly important in the case
of Spain because Spanish firms are small in interna-
tional terms, entry rates are relatively low and the
Spanish economy is characterized by low TFP growth.
Second, this paper finds that the impact of the
judicial system critically depends on the type of
procedure used. Specifically, we find that judicial
efficacy at the declaratory stage (i.e., when a debt is
declared and recognized by a judge) has a positive
impact on firm size, firm growth and entry rates, while
judicial efficacy at the execution stage (i.e., when the
judge requires its payment) has no significant impact
whatsoever. Various reasons may be influencing this
fact: penalties for delayed payment (the interest rate
paid as a punishment is usually quite high), risk
aversion (even if the probability of punishment is
small, individuals may suffer from a disutility higher
than the expected punishment), internalization of
social values (the ‘‘right’’ thing to do is to abide by
the law, once there is a ruling against the company)
and reputation (there is an immediate damage to the
reputation of the company when it loses a trial,
whether or not it decides to comply with the obliga-
tions imposed in the judgment). While the Spanish
judicial system suffers from higher general inefficacy
than that of neighboring countries (Palumbo et al.
2013), this paper proposes a guide on where to
concentrate efforts to optimize the resources invested
in the Spanish judicial system: preference should be
given to speeding up declaratory judgments. In any
case, at the research level, our findings warn that the
use of ‘‘aggregate’’ measures of civil efficacy, as done
in the previous literature, may provide an incomplete
view of the problem.
Finally, another contribution of the paper is to use
more consistent measures of judicial efficacy in Spain
than previous literature. We constructed measures of
judicial efficacy with real performance data extracted
from the courts and not survey data or statistical
estimations. Moreover, this is first time that the
relationship between firm size and judicial efficacy is
analyzed in the case of Spain following the introduc-
tion of the new Civil Procedural Law in 2000.
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Appendix A: size distribution of firms in Spain according to our sample. 
Tables A1 and A2 show the size distribution of firms in Spain by province and by year as 
the arithmetic averages of employment and revenue, respectively. In terms of the two 
measures we can observe two stylized facts of the Spanish economy: 
(i) Spanish companies are small. The average firm in the sample has 20 employees 
and it generates revenue of 3.5 million Euros. The median firm is even smaller, it has 
5 employees and it generates revenue of 400,000 Euros (see Table 3 of the main text), 
as the size distribution is right skewed. According to the classification of small and 
medium-sized enterprises by the European Commission (2003), the median (average) 
firm in the sample would be a micro (small) firm.  This is consistent with Núñez 
(2004) and López-García and Sánchez (2010), who find that the majority of 
companies in Spain are small. 
(ii) The most industrialized provinces have, on average, the largest companies. 
Madrid, Barcelona, the Basque country provinces (Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya) 
and Navarra have the highest mean of employment and revenue. 
Table A1: Firm’s size: arithmetic average of number of employees 
Table A2: Firm’s size: arithmetic average of real revenue (millions of €, year 2000 
prices) 
Appendix B: regression analysis of verbal judgments 
Tables B1 and B2 show the impact of judicial efficacy in verbal judgments on firm size 
and growth, where firm size is measured by (log) total employment (Table B1) or (log) 
real revenue (Table B2) and firm growth by the annual growth rate of those variables. 
As in the case of ordinary judgments, Congestion Verbal always has a highly significant 
and negative coefficient, suggesting that judicial (in)efficacy has a negative impact on 
firm size and hampers firm growth. In fact, the coefficients are substantially larger (in 
absolute value) than those for ordinary judgments (tables 6 and 7). 
In order to evaluate the size of the effect we can carry out the same experiment as in the 
case of ordinary judgments. Attributing to the province with the worst judicial efficacy the 
best law enforcement in our sample1, the relative increase in firm size would range 
between a 1.5 and a 5.1 percent, while annual firm growth would rise between 1.3 and 3.6 
percentage points. Hence the effect on size is modest (though higher than for ordinary), 
while the effect on growth is quite remarkable, especially when noticing that the average 
growth rate for the period 2002-2009 was -3.1% and 0.1% in terms of revenue and 
employment, respectively. 
1The province with the best law enforcement (i.e., lowest value of Congestion Ratio) is Salamanca, with an 
average value of 1.30 for the period 2001-2009, while the province with the worst law enforcement (i.e. highest 
value of Congestion Ratio) is Alicante, with an average value of 1.76 for the same period. Therefore, the 
simulated change amounts to (1.30-1.76)*100/1.76=-26%.  
Table B1:  Impact of judicial efficacy (verbal) on firm size and growth: employment 
The dependent variable is the log of total employment in regressions (1)-(4) and the annual employment growth 
in regressions (5)-(8).  All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. 
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated 
regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Verbal) -0.056*** -0.070*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.094*** -0.088*** -0.049*** -0.049***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(Age) 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.158*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(Age)^2 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tangibility 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (GDP) 0.139*** 0.131*** 0.024 0.031**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.033*** -0.037***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit/GDP 0.027*** 0.027*** -0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Npl ratio -0.261*** -0.286*** -0.108*** -0.084***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
Dar/GDP -0.197** -0.233*** -0.322*** -0.300***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.085) (0.085)
Branches -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Weight energy 0.427*** 0.429*** 0.100 0.107
(0.093) (0.093) (0.069) (0.069)
Weight manufacturing 0.499*** 0.522*** 0.134*** 0.125***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.045) (0.046)
Weight construction 0.646*** 0.658*** 0.147*** 0.146***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.048) (0.048)
Weight market services 0.584*** 0.584*** 0.100** 0.112**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.047) (0.048)
Weight non-market services 0.129* 0.167** 0.117** 0.095
(0.071) (0.071) (0.058) (0.058)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Vertical integration -0.429*** -0.425*** -0.107** -0.107**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.052) (0.052)
Incorporation rate 0.055 0.057 -0.083*** -0.087***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.029) (0.029)
Foreigners -0.001*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Tax pressure) -0.001 -0.001 -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Crime rate 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PhD graduates 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Log(HHI) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.180*** -0.173***
(0.053) (0.042)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,861,174 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,274,990 2,271,386 2,271,386 2,271,386
Number of firms 460,170 458,189 458,189 458,189 435,204 433,558 433,558 433,558
R-squared (Within) 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015
Log (employment) Employment growth
Table B2:  Impact of judicial efficacy (verbal) on firm size and growth: real revenue 
The dependent variable is the log of real revenue in regressions (1)-(4) and the annual real revenue growth in 
regressions (5)-(8).  All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. 
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated 
regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Verbal) -0.150*** -0.166*** -0.098*** -0.097*** -0.137*** -0.125*** -0.058*** -0.058***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Log(Age) 0.399*** 0.402*** 0.402*** -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.296***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Age)^2 -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Tangibility -0.149*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log (GDP) 0.195*** 0.187*** -0.037 -0.032
(0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.203*** -0.199*** -0.095*** -0.097***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Credit/GDP 0.049*** 0.049*** -0.009** -0.008*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Npl ratio -0.431*** -0.456*** -0.090** -0.074*
(0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039)
Dar/GDP -0.325** -0.362*** -0.670*** -0.655***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.134) (0.134)
Branches -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weight energy 0.816*** 0.818*** -0.020 -0.016
(0.138) (0.138) (0.111) (0.111)
Weight manufacturing 0.711*** 0.735*** 0.132* 0.126*
(0.093) (0.094) (0.074) (0.074)
Weight construction 1.661*** 1.673*** -0.211*** -0.212***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.078) (0.078)
Weight market services 1.428*** 1.428*** -0.112 -0.105
(0.089) (0.089) (0.075) (0.075)
Weight non-market services 0.338*** 0.378*** -0.050 -0.064
(0.107) (0.107) (0.091) (0.092)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.002 -0.001 -0.011** -0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Vertical integration -1.055*** -1.051*** -0.498*** -0.498***
(0.098) (0.098) (0.090) (0.090)
Incorporation rate 0.172*** 0.174*** -0.080* -0.083*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.046) (0.046)
Foreigners -0.001** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.004* 0.004* -0.033*** -0.034***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Crime rate 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PhD graduates 0.013* 0.011 0.005 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Log(HHI) -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.187** -0.114
(0.081) (0.070)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,861,174 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,274,990 2,271,386 2,271,386 2,271,386
Number of firms 460,170 458,189 458,189 458,189 435,204 433,558 433,558 433,558
R-squared (Within) 0.027 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.030
Log (revenue) Revenue growth
The impact of judicial (in)efficacy, as measured by the (log) congestion rate of verbal 
judgments (Congestion Verbal), on entry and exit rates is displayed in Table B3. The 
results are similar than in the case of ordinary judgments. The coefficient on Congestion 
Verbal is negative and statistically significant in all the regressions where the dependent 
variable is the (log) entry rate (and substantially larger, in absolute value, than that for 
ordinary judgments, see Table 10) while it is never statistically different from zero when 
the dependent variable is the (log) exit rate. The results are robust to specifying the 
dependent variables without the logarithmic transformation. 
Those results suggest that judicial efficacy in verbal judgments promotes entry and has no 
effect on exit. We can estimate the size of the effect by using the same experiment as in 
the cases of firm size and growth. Attributing to the province with the worst judicial 
efficacy the best law enforcement in our sample, the relative increase in its entry rate 
would range between a 9.4 and a 12.8 percent. Hence the effect is not only statistically 
significant but also economically relevant (and larger than for ordinary). 
Table B3:  Impact of judicial efficacy (verbal) on entry and exit rates 
The dependent variable is the log of entry rate in regressions (1)-(4) and the log of exit rate in regressions (5)-(8). 
All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts 
receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province level. Clustered standard errors below 
coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Verbal) -0.299** -0.400** -0.397** -0.395** 0.131 -0.051 -0.047 -0.052
(0.128) (0.159) (0.158) (0.160) (0.169) (0.158) (0.160) (0.159)
Log (GDP) -0.113 -0.119 -0.193 -0.205
(0.337) (0.342) (0.274) (0.275)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.211** -0.206** -0.196** 0.098 0.108 0.075
(0.081) (0.077) (0.082) (0.061) (0.066) (0.075)
Credit/GDP 0.091 0.090 0.088 0.039 0.036 0.026
(0.088) (0.087) (0.084) (0.066) (0.064) (0.061)
Npl ratio -0.028 -0.067 -0.056 0.175 0.096 0.058
(0.303) (0.306) (0.295) (0.355) (0.363) (0.358)
Dar/GDP -0.830 -0.876 -0.813 -0.519 -0.610 -0.736
(2.004) (2.045) (2.041) (2.082) (2.052) (2.030)
Branches -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 0.038* 0.038* 0.040**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Weight energy 0.243 0.230 0.215 0.971 0.944 1.142
(0.878) (0.892) (0.831) (0.900) (0.916) (0.928)
Weight manufacturing 0.631 0.639 0.670 0.794 0.810 0.931
(0.754) (0.755) (0.776) (0.808) (0.816) (0.801)
Weight construction 0.387 0.403 0.334 0.804 0.836 1.063
(0.714) (0.710) (0.733) (0.866) (0.876) (0.887)
Weight market services 1.334* 1.339* 1.404* 0.397 0.406 0.515
(0.709) (0.712) (0.786) (0.628) (0.637) (0.599)
Weight non-market services 2.291* 2.348* 2.325* 0.769 0.881 1.022
(1.207) (1.235) (1.263) (0.876) (0.905) (0.913)
Log (Capital intensity) 0.092* 0.089* 0.089* 0.082 0.078 0.078
(0.048) (0.046) (0.045) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
Vertical integration 0.749 0.715 0.739 -0.800 -0.867 -0.950
(1.908) (1.869) (1.869) (0.968) (0.980) (0.997)
Foreigners 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.018** 0.020*** 0.015**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.086** 0.087** 0.083**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Crime rate -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 0.019 0.018 0.020
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
PhD graduates -0.070 -0.072 -0.074 -0.025 -0.028 -0.022
(0.106) (0.108) (0.109) (0.147) (0.146) (0.148)
Log(HHI) -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Lawyers 0.420 0.383 0.835 0.915
(0.929) (0.941) (1.106) (1.102)
Log (GDP per capita) 0.071 -0.399
(0.282) (0.286)
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Number of provinces 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.51
Log(entry rate) Log(exit rate)
Appendix C: regressors’ correlation matrices. 
Table C1 : correlation matrix (intensive margin)2 
2 Notice that correlations between two province-level variables may differ between the dataset for the analysis of 
the intensive margin and that for the analysis of the extensive margin. The reason is that, as the extensive-margin 
dataset is a balanced panel, we have the same number of observations for every province. By contrast, as the 
Table C2: correlation matrix (extensive margin) 
intensive-margin dataset is a firm-level panel and there is not the same number of firms from each province in 
every year, some provinces are observed more than others. 
Appendix D: regressions for the intensive margin without industries where multi-
plant firms are common. 
Regressions taking out the following industries, according to the NACE Rev. 
1.1. classification: 
   -65.Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding. 
-66. Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security. 
Table D1: Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on firm size and growth: 
employment 
The dependent variable is the log of total employment in regressions (1)-(4) and the annual employment growth 
in regressions (5)-(8).  All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. 
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated 
regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Ordinary) -0.012*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.027*** -0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(Age) 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158*** -0.149*** -0.151*** -0.151***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log(Age)^2 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tangibility 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log (GDP) 0.133*** 0.126*** 0.015 0.023
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.035*** -0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit/GDP 0.026*** 0.025*** -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Npl ratio -0.276*** -0.300*** -0.122*** -0.097***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
Dar/GDP -0.243*** -0.281*** -0.326*** -0.300***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.085) (0.085)
Branches -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Weight energy 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.118* 0.128*
(0.093) (0.093) (0.070) (0.070)
Weight manufacturing 0.429*** 0.451*** 0.117** 0.110**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.045) (0.045)
Weight construction 0.623*** 0.635*** 0.137*** 0.135***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.048) (0.048)
Weight market services 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Weight non-market services 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Vertical integration -0.454*** -0.447*** -0.154*** -0.157***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.054) (0.054)
Incorporation rate 0.072* 0.074* -0.067** -0.071**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029)
Foreigners -0.001*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Tax pressure) -0.001 -0.001 -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Crime rate 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PhD graduates 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Log(HHI) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.182*** -0.185***
(0.053) (0.042)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,855,845 2,850,306 2,850,306 2,850,306 2,271,217 2,267,314 2,267,314 2,267,314
Number of firms 459,055 457,170 457,170 457,170 434,224 432,634 432,634 432,634
R-squared (Within) 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015
Log (employment) Employment growth
Table D2: Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on firm size and growth: 
real revenue 
The dependent variable is the log of real revenue in regressions (1)-(4) and the annual real revenue growth in 
regressions (5)-(8).  All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. 
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated 
regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Ordinary) -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.066*** -0.059*** -0.027*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Age) 0.400*** 0.401*** 0.401*** -0.429*** -0.429*** -0.430***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(Age)^2 -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.094***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Tangibility -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log (GDP) 0.184*** 0.176*** -0.044* -0.038
(0.031) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.208*** -0.204*** -0.097*** -0.101***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Credit/GDP 0.047*** 0.046*** -0.011** -0.010**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Npl ratio -0.460*** -0.486*** -0.113*** -0.094**
(0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039)
Dar/GDP -0.423*** -0.462*** -0.724*** -0.705***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.135) (0.135)
Branches -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weight energy 0.785*** 0.784*** -0.024 -0.017
(0.139) (0.139) (0.111) (0.111)
Weight manufacturing 0.583*** 0.606*** 0.101 0.096
(0.094) (0.094) (0.074) (0.074)
Weight construction 1.617*** 1.630*** -0.242*** -0.243***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.078) (0.078)
Weight market services 0.014*** 0.014*** -0.002** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Weight non-market services 0.002** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.005 -0.005 -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Vertical integration -1.103*** -1.096*** -0.516*** -0.519***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.092) (0.092)
Incorporation rate 0.206*** 0.208*** -0.067 -0.070
(0.057) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047)
Foreigners -0.002*** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.004* 0.004* -0.034*** -0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Crime rate 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.003* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PhD graduates 0.016** 0.013* 0.007 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Log(HHI) -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.189** -0.133*
(0.082) (0.070)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,855,845 2,850,306 2,850,306 2,850,306 2,271,217 2,267,314 2,267,314 2,267,314
Number of firms 459,055 457,170 457,170 457,170 434,224 432,634 432,634 432,634
R-squared (Within) 0.026 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.026 0.028 0.029 0.029
Log (revenue) Revenue growth
Table D3: Impact of judicial efficacy (executory judgments) on firm size 
and growth: employment. 
The dependent variable is the log of total employment in regressions (1)-(4) and the annual employment growth 
in regressions (5)-(8).  All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. 
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated 
regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Executions) -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Age) 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158*** -0.147*** -0.151*** -0.151***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log(Age)^2 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tangibility 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (GDP) 0.138*** 0.130*** 0.022 0.030**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.059*** -0.054*** -0.037*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit/GDP 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Npl ratio -0.271*** -0.297*** -0.118*** -0.094***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
Dar/GDP -0.290*** -0.326*** -0.401*** -0.377***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.084) (0.084)
Branches -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Weight energy 0.360*** 0.363*** 0.040 0.048
(0.093) (0.093) (0.069) (0.069)
Weight manufacturing 0.379*** 0.405*** 0.036 0.029
(0.061) (0.061) (0.044) (0.044)
Weight construction 0.604*** 0.618*** 0.132*** 0.129***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.048) (0.048)
Weight market services 0.520*** 0.523*** 0.050 0.061
(0.059) (0.059) (0.047) (0.047)
Weight non-market services 0.046 0.087 0.041 0.020
(0.070) (0.070) (0.057) (0.057)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Vertical integration -0.401*** -0.398*** -0.072 -0.072
(0.063) (0.063) (0.052) (0.052)
Incorporation rate 0.065* 0.067* -0.087*** -0.090***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.029) (0.029)
Foreigners -0.001*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Tax pressure) -0.001 -0.001 -0.029*** -0.031***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Crime rate 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PhD graduates 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Log(HHI) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.187*** -0.172***
(0.053) (0.042)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,855,845 2,850,306 2,850,306 2,850,306 2,271,217 2,267,802 2,267,802 2,267,802
Number of firms 459,055 457,170 457,170 457,170 434,224 432,646 432,646 432,646
R-squared (Within) 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015
Log (employment) Employment growth
Table D4: Impact of judicial efficacy (executory judgments) on firm size 
and growth: real revenue. 
The dependent variable is the log of real revenue in regressions (1)-(4) and the annual real revenue growth in 
regressions (5)-(8).  All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. 
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated 
regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Executions) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001* -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(Age) 0.400*** 0.401*** 0.401*** -0.427*** -0.430*** -0.430***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(Age)^2 -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.094***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Tangibility -0.149*** -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log (GDP) 0.194*** 0.185*** -0.038 -0.033
(0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.210*** -0.205*** -0.100*** -0.103***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Credit/GDP 0.047*** 0.046*** -0.010** -0.009**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Npl ratio -0.455*** -0.484*** -0.105*** -0.088**
(0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039)
Dar/GDP -0.534*** -0.573*** -0.777*** -0.761***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.134) (0.134)
Branches -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weight energy 0.673*** 0.677*** -0.096 -0.091
(0.138) (0.138) (0.110) (0.110)
Weight manufacturing 0.467*** 0.495*** 0.008 0.004
(0.092) (0.093) (0.071) (0.071)
Weight construction 1.587*** 1.602*** -0.238*** -0.240***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.078) (0.078)
Weight market services 1.312*** 1.315*** -0.177** -0.170**
(0.089) (0.089) (0.074) (0.075)
Weight non-market services 0.171 0.217** -0.149* -0.164*
(0.106) (0.106) (0.090) (0.091)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.006 -0.005 -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Vertical integration -0.997*** -0.994*** -0.452*** -0.452***
(0.098) (0.098) (0.089) (0.089)
Incorporation rate 0.187*** 0.189*** -0.085* -0.087*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.046) (0.046)
Foreigners -0.002** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.004 0.004* -0.036*** -0.037***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Crime rate 0.011*** 0.010*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PhD graduates 0.014** 0.012* 0.006 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Log(HHI) -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.207** -0.119*
(0.082) (0.070)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,855,845 2,850,306 2,850,306 2,850,306 2,271,217 2,267,802 2,267,802 2,267,802
Number of firms 459,055 457,170 457,170 457,170 434,224 432,646 432,646 432,646
R-squared (Within) 0.026 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.030
Log (revenue) Revenue growth
Appendix E: analysis of entry rates at the province-industry level. 
In the paper the analysis of entry (and exit) rates has been carried out at 
the provincial level, without taking into account the industry of the firms.  Such an 
analysis ignores that barriers to entry may differ across industries due to factors 
such as the cost of initial investments and the industry’s degree of competition. It 
also implicitly defines the market at the territorial level, which is a simplifying 
assumption: while market definition is often a difficult task, it usually hinges on 
two dimensions, the spatial one and the industrial one.   
The analysis of entry/exit rates at the province-industry level has not been 
possible due to data constraints. Information on the number of firms is only 
publicly available, from the Spanish National Institute (INE), at the region3-industry 
level4. Information on the number of entries/exits is only publicly available at the 
industry level (we have the distribution of entries/exits by province thanks to a 
special agreement between the Bank of Spain and the INE).    
Nevertheless, we have carried out a robustness analysis for a subset of 
entrant and incumbent firms for which we have data on both province and 
industry, thanks to the agreement between the Bank of Spain and the INE and 
additional data provided by the Central Balance Sheet Data Office of the Bank of 
Spain. Specifically, we have data on entrant and incumbent limited liability firms5 
with more than 50 employees, so we can construct entry rates (but no exit rates, 
as we don’t have any information on exits). As those firms are not representative 
of the whole population of Spanish companies (they only accounted for the 
0.76%6 of all firms in the period 2001-2009), they cannot constitute the focus of 
our major analyses. Anyhow, they can be used to carry out some additional 
analyses in which the industry dimension is also exploited.  
Entry rates were computed at the province-industry level, where there 
were six industries, consequence of the aggregation of several NACE Rev. 2. 
divisions. While the data were available at two digits, it had to be aggregated 
because many province-sector combinations had zero companies, which would 
have yield a missing value for the corresponding entry rate. The six industries 
were: primary sector (including mining and quarrying); manufacturing; supply of 
electricity, water and gas; construction; market services and non-market services. 
Find at the end of this supplement their description. 
3 Spain has 17 regions (Comunidades Autonómas) and 50 provinces (provincias). Each region comprises 
one or more provinces.  
4 See INE’S Companies Central Directory:
http://www.ine.es/jaxiBD/menu.do?type=db&divi=dir&his=0&L=1 
5 In Spain limited liability companies are denominated either Sociedad anónima or Sociedad de 
responsabilidal Limitada.  
6 Source: authors’ computations from the INE’S Companies Central Directory.  
The regressions are displayed in the table below. All of them include 
time dummies and province-industry fixed effects, i.e., a dummy for every 
province-industry combination. At variance with the paper’s main analyses, the 
dependent variable entry rate is used in levels, rather than in logs, as it has a 
substantial percentage of zeros: there was no entry of limited liability firms with 
more than 50 employees in many markets (province-industry combinations)7. To 
correct for that unconditional tobit regressions are carried out8.  Regardless of the 
specification, our key regressor Congestion Rate is negative and significant at any 
level.  The impact is also economically significant. Attributing to the province with 
the worst judicial efficacy the best law enforcement in our sample9, entry rates 
would rise between 1.2 and 1.3 percentage points. This is a very large effect, as 
the mean of the variable “Entry rate” is 1.37 and its standard deviation is 3.48 in 
this dataset (only limited liability firms with more than 50 employees)10.  
7 The main reason of the large proportion of zeros even after industry aggregation is that there was no 
information about the industry of many firms in the original dataset (CNAE Rev. 2 at two digits), for which 
only the province of their registered offices was available. But, as long as we believe that those missing 
values are randomly distributed across industries and provinces, there should not be any sampling bias.  
8There is no parametric conditional fixed-effects tobit because there does not exist a sufficient statistic 
allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood and the semiparametric fixed-effect tobit 
of Honoré (1992) does not always converge. While the unconditional tobit is biased, Greene (2004) shows 
that the bias is small for panels with T>5, as it is our case.    
9The province with the best law enforcement (i.e., lowest value of Congestion Ratio) is Alava, with an 
average value of 1.65 for the period 2001-2009, while the province with the worst law enforcement (i.e. 
highest value of Congestion Ratio) is Alicante, with an average value of 2.80 for the same period. 
Therefore, the simulated change amounts to (1.65-2.80)*100/2.80=-41.2%.  
10 The mean entry rate in this dataset (province-sector level), 1.37, is very low relative to the reported 
mean entry rate in the paper, 10.88. The reason is the large proportion of zeros in the former, as 
previously explained.  
Table E1: determinants of entry rates at the province-industry level 
Estimator: unconditional Tobit. The dependent variable is the entry rate. All 
regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Ordinary) -2.290*** -2.445*** -2.433*** -2.412***
(0.032) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log (GDP) -3.123*** -3.198***
(0.001) (0.001)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.720*** -0.678*** -0.671***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Credit/GDP 1.573*** 1.554*** 1.556***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Npl ratio 11.448*** 11.173*** 11.083***
(1.390) (1.389) (1.389)
Dar/GDP -39.678*** -40.691*** -40.333***
(2.212) (2.206) (2.210)
Branches -0.414*** -0.418*** -0.451***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Weight energy -7.245*** -7.195*** -6.820***
(0.215) (0.213) (0.212)
Weight manufacturing 23.889*** 23.990*** 24.834***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Weight construction 39.478*** 39.593*** 39.537***
(0.129) (0.128) (0.128)
Weight market services 8.259*** 8.344*** 10.103***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Weight non-market services 38.159*** 38.677*** 39.146***
(0.084) (0.083) (0.083)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.871*** -0.885*** -0.911***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Vertical integration -22.277*** -22.502*** -22.580***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Foreigners 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.066***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(Tax pressure) -0.860*** -0.858*** -0.899***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Crime rate -1.049*** -1.052*** -1.042***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PhD graduates 0.772*** 0.754*** 0.772***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Log(HHI) -1.334*** -1.334*** -1.341***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 2.874*** 2.448***
(0.032) (0.032)
Log (GDP per capita) -0.954***
(0.004)
Province-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,448
Number of provinces 50 50 50 50
Number of industries 6 6 6 6
Pseudo R-squared 13.9 14.0 14.0 14.0
Entry rate
industry level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Aggregation of industries for the regressions (NACE Rev. 2) 
-Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A) and mining and quarrying (B). 
-Manufacturing (C). 
-Supply of electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning (D). Water supply, 
sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (E). 
-Construction (F). 
-Market services: wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles (G); transportation and storage (H); accommodation and food service 
activities (I); information and communication(J); financial and insurance activities 
(K); real estate activities (L); professional, scientific and technical activities (M); 
administrative and support service activities (N). 
-Non-market services: education (P); human health and social work 
activities (Q); arts, entertainment and recreation (R); other services activities (S).  
(The industries “O.Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security”, “T. Activities of households as employers, undifferentiated goods-and-
services-producing activities of households for own use” and “U.Activities of 
extraterritorial organisations and bodies” have not been used because there were 
no firms belonging to them).  
Appendix F: accounting for non-linearities in the relationship between court 
congestion and firm size and growth. 
Table F1: Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on firm size and growth: 
employment. 
The dependent variable is the log of total employment in regressions (1)-(4) and the annual employment growth 
in regressions (5)-(8).  All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Ordinary) -0.027*** -0.045*** -0.012 -0.014* 0.145*** 0.150*** 0.068*** 0.073***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Log (Congestion Ordinary)^2 0.007** 0.012*** -0.002 -0.000 -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.064*** -0.068***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Log(Age) 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(Age)^2 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tangibility 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (GDP) 0.133*** 0.125*** 0.018 0.027*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.030*** -0.035***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit/GDP 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Npl ratio -0.275*** -0.300*** -0.113*** -0.083***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
Dar/GDP -0.248*** -0.286*** -0.282*** -0.248***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.085) (0.085)
Branches -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Weight energy 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.123* 0.135*
(0.093) (0.093) (0.070) (0.070)
Weight manufacturing 0.429*** 0.451*** 0.117** 0.110**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.045) (0.045)
Weight construction 0.623*** 0.634*** 0.098** 0.093*
(0.062) (0.062) (0.048) (0.048)
Weight market services 0.548*** 0.548*** 0.024 0.036
(0.060) (0.060) (0.048) (0.048)
Weight non-market services 0.069 0.108 0.084 0.058
(0.070) (0.071) (0.057) (0.058)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Vertical integration -0.452*** -0.446*** -0.131** -0.133**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.054) (0.054)
Incorporation rate 0.072* 0.074* -0.078*** -0.084***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029)
Foreigners -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Tax pressure) -0.001 -0.001 -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Crime rate 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PhD graduates 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Log(HHI) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.184*** -0.213***
(0.053) (0.042)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,861,174 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,274,990 2,271,386 2,271,386 2,271,386
Number of firms 460,170 458,189 458,189 458,189 435,204 433,558 433,558 433,558
R-squared (Within) 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02
Wald test  6.69*** 18.43***  8.01*** 6.68***  32.71*** 46.99*** 14.52*** 13.02***
Log (employment) Employment growth
Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-
deviated regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table F2: Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on firm size and growth: 
revenue. 
The dependent variable is the log of real revenue in regressions (1)-(4) and the annual real revenue growth in 
regressions (5)-(8).  All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Log (Congestion Ordinary) -0.084*** -0.102*** -0.019 -0.020 0.298*** 0.311*** 0.115*** 0.119***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Log (Congestion Ordinary)^2 0.020*** 0.025*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.237*** -0.240*** -0.095*** -0.098***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Log(Age) 0.400*** 0.402*** 0.402*** -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.296***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Age)^2 -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Tangibility -0.149*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log (GDP) 0.183*** 0.175*** -0.042* -0.035
(0.031) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.209*** -0.204*** -0.091*** -0.095***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Credit/GDP 0.048*** 0.047*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Npl ratio -0.457*** -0.483*** -0.092** -0.069*
(0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039)
Dar/GDP -0.422*** -0.461*** -0.626*** -0.600***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.135) (0.135)
Branches -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weight energy 0.784*** 0.783*** -0.008 0.001
(0.138) (0.138) (0.111) (0.112)
Weight manufacturing 0.576*** 0.599*** 0.096 0.090
(0.094) (0.094) (0.074) (0.074)
Weight construction 1.617*** 1.629*** -0.283*** -0.286***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.079) (0.079)
Weight market services 1.358*** 1.358*** -0.224*** -0.215***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.076) (0.076)
Weight non-market services 0.221** 0.261** -0.101 -0.121
(0.106) (0.107) (0.091) (0.091)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.005 -0.005 -0.009** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Vertical integration -1.102*** -1.096*** -0.500*** -0.502***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.092) (0.092)
Incorporation rate 0.205*** 0.207*** -0.084* -0.088*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047)
Foreigners -0.002*** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.003 0.004 -0.030*** -0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Crime rate 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.004** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PhD graduates 0.016** 0.014* 0.006 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Log(HHI) -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.189** -0.164**
(0.082) (0.070)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,861,174 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,274,990 2,271,386 2,271,386 2,271,386
Number of firms 460,170 458,189 458,189 458,189 435,204 433,558 433,558 433,558
R-squared (Within) 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03
Wald test  209.35*** 194.47***  39.52***  43.00*** 178.70*** 169.08*** 21.72***  22.82***
Log (revenue) Revenue growth
  
defaulted accounts receivable. “ H H I ”  i s  t h e  Herfindahl–Hirschman Index a t  t h e  p r o v i n c e -industry 
level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-
deviated regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix G: checking the sensitivity of the coefficients on foreigners and 
crime rate to changes in the set of controls.
Table G1: Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on firm size and growth: 
specification 3 [Log (GDP per capita) instead of Log (GDP)] 
The dependent variable is the log of total employment in regression (1), the log of real revenue in (2) and their 
annual growth rates in (3) and (4). All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log (employment) Log (revenue) Employment growth Revenue growth
Log (Congestion Ordinary) -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Log(Age) 0.158*** 0.402*** -0.151*** -0.432***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Log(Age)^2 0.009*** -0.068*** 0.025*** 0.095***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Tangibility 0.026*** -0.151*** -0.027*** -0.153***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Log (GDP per capita) 0.247*** 0.591*** 0.131*** 0.160***
(0.020) (0.030) (0.015) (0.025)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.037*** -0.154*** -0.023*** -0.081***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Credit/GDP 0.035*** 0.072*** 0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Npl ratio -0.269*** -0.450*** -0.117*** -0.103***
(0.023) (0.039) (0.021) (0.037)
Dar/GDP -0.156* -0.166 -0.264*** -0.608***
(0.081) (0.129) (0.085) (0.135)
Branches -0.014*** -0.042*** -0.011*** -0.027***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Weight energy 0.260*** 0.380*** -0.002 -0.198*
(0.092) (0.138) (0.071) (0.114)
Weight manufacturing 0.416*** 0.533*** 0.093** 0.053
(0.062) (0.094) (0.046) (0.074)
Weight construction 0.456*** 1.143*** 0.023 -0.397***
(0.063) (0.095) (0.050) (0.081)
Weight market services 0.451*** 1.145*** 0.027 -0.207***
(0.058) (0.087) (0.048) (0.076)
Weight non-market services -0.006 0.027 0.020 -0.200**
(0.070) (0.106) (0.058) (0.092)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.016*** 0.001 -0.015*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Vertical integration -0.406*** -0.995*** -0.118** -0.479***
(0.063) (0.099) (0.054) (0.093)
Incorporation rate 0.077** 0.147*** -0.092*** -0.129***
(0.038) (0.056) (0.028) (0.045)
Foreigners 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.001 0.008*** -0.024*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Crime rate 0.002 0.006*** 0.001 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
PhD graduates -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
Log(HHI) -0.012*** -0.036*** -0.006*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,271,386 2,271,386
Number of firms 458,189 458,189 433,558 433,558
R-squared (Within) 0.017 0.038 0.015 0.030
“Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry 
level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-
deviated regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table G2: Impact of judicial efficacy (ordinary) on firm size and growth: 
specification 4 [Log (GDP per capita) instead of Log (GDP)] 
The 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log (employment) Log (revenue) Employment growth Revenue growth
Log (Congestion Ordinary) -0.010** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Log(Age) 0.158*** 0.402*** -0.152*** -0.432***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
Log(Age)^2 0.009*** -0.068*** 0.026*** 0.095***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Tangibility 0.026*** -0.151*** -0.027*** -0.153***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Log (GDP per capita) 0.240*** 0.592*** 0.142*** 0.170***
(0.020) (0.030) (0.015) (0.025)
Log (Unemployment rate) -0.035*** -0.154*** -0.028*** -0.085***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Credit/GDP 0.035*** 0.072*** 0.004 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Npl ratio -0.285*** -0.448*** -0.085*** -0.074*
(0.024) (0.040) (0.022) (0.039)
Dar/GDP -0.183** -0.162 -0.227*** -0.576***
(0.081) (0.129) (0.085) (0.136)
Branches -0.014*** -0.042*** -0.011*** -0.027***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Weight energy 0.264*** 0.380*** 0.005 -0.192*
(0.092) (0.138) (0.071) (0.114)
Weight manufacturing 0.430*** 0.531*** 0.083* 0.045
(0.062) (0.094) (0.046) (0.074)
Weight construction 0.468*** 1.141*** 0.015 -0.404***
(0.063) (0.095) (0.050) (0.081)
Weight market services 0.454*** 1.145*** 0.039 -0.197***
(0.058) (0.087) (0.048) (0.076)
Weight non-market services 0.020 0.024 -0.012 -0.228**
(0.070) (0.106) (0.059) (0.093)
Log (Capital intensity) -0.016*** 0.001 -0.015*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Vertical integration -0.403*** -0.995*** -0.120** -0.481***
(0.063) (0.099) (0.054) (0.093)
Incorporation rate 0.077** 0.147*** -0.095*** -0.132***
(0.038) (0.056) (0.028) (0.045)
Foreigners 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Log(Tax pressure) 0.001 0.008*** -0.025*** -0.030***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Crime rate 0.002 0.006*** 0.001 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
PhD graduates -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
Log(HHI) -0.012*** -0.036*** -0.006*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Lawyers 0.116** -0.014 -0.231*** -0.203***
(0.054) (0.083) (0.042) (0.070)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,855,325 2,855,325 2,271,386 2,271,386
Number of firms 458,189 458,189 433,558 433,558
R-squared (Within) 0.017 0.038 0.015 0.030
The dependent variable is the log of total employment in regression (1), the log of real revenue in (2) and their 
annual growth rates in (3) and (4). All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and 
“Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. “HHI” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the province-industry 
level. Clustered standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-
deviated regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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